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THE PUBLIC CHOICE CASE AGAINST
THE ITEM VETO
MAXwELL L. STEARNs*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the Supreme Court, in Bowsher v. Synar,' struck the automatic
budget-cutting mechanism in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act,2 the bur-3
geoning federal deficit has become an increasingly prominent political issue.
During the Reagan administration, the federal budget exceeded an unprecedented one trillion dollars and the federal budget deficit correspondingly
reached an unprecedented high. 4 Congress amended the Gramm-RudmanHollings Act in 1987 to cure the constitutional defect and to restore the
automatic sequestration procedure by vesting it with the Office of Management and Budget, an arm of the executive branch, rather than with the
* B.A. 1983, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1987, University of Virginia School of
Law. The author, presently a litigation associate at Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz in Philadelphia,

Pennsylvania, will be an Assistant Professor this fall at George Mason University School of
Law in Arlington, Virginia.
The author would like to thank Professor Glen 0. Robinson for his insightful guidance
and comments on the initial draft of this article. In addition, the author is indebted to the
following individuals for their valuable comments on prior drafts: Matthew H. Adler, Esq.;
Richard S. Gabriel, Esq.; Aaron Krauss, Esq.; James R. Pagano, Esq.; Bruce Steen, Esq.;
and Thomas E. Zemaitis, Esq. Finally, the author wishes to thank Staci Johnston for her
secretarial assistance, Janis Lee for her diligent work in tracking down hard-to-find source
materials, and Mary Beth Lee for her fine art work in converting his rough sketches into the
matrices that appear in the text.
1. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
2. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 735-36 (1986). Section 251 of The Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, 2 U.S.C. § 901 (1988), et seq., authorized the
Comptroller General to set forth budget cuts, binding on the President, in the event that
Congress did not limit the deficit to a specified amount in any given year based upon a
statutory formula. 2 U.S.C. § 901. Because the Comptroller General is removable by Congress
rather than by the President, the Bowsher Court held the statute's automatic budget-cutting
mechanism an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers on the ground that the statute
vests an arm of Congress with an executive function. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 734. The Court
further held the unconstitutional provision severable from the remainder of the statute, leaving
in place the statute's fallback provision, § 274(f). Id. at 735-36. That provision authorizes
Congress, through joint resolution, to recommend a deficit reduction proposal to the President.
Id. at 718-19.
3. William F. Buckley, Jr., The Big D; FederalDeficit, NAT'L REv., Feb. 13, 1987, at
60-61; Joel Dreyfuss et al., Boo to the Boring Budget of 1988, FORTUNE, Feb. 2, 1987, at 8;
Paul C. Roberts, Budget Delusions... and FiscalFollies, WAsH. Tnims, Feb. 8, 1991, at Fl;
Barbara Rudolph, Pie in the Sky, the White House and Congress Battle to Cut a Trillion
Dollar Budget, TimsE, Jan. 12, 1987, at 52-53; Think Tank Sees $1 Trillion U.S. Deficit, UPI,
March 11, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
4. See Rudolph, supra note 3, at 52.
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Comptroller General, an arm of Congress.'
Nonetheless, the federal budget,
6
and deficit, have continued to grow.
Among the most frequently proposed tools to help deal with this looming

budgetary crisis is the item veto. 7 The item veto would enable the President
to veto particular items in proposed legislation without having to veto the
entire bill.8 The concept underlying the proposal is simple: by enabling the
President to accept bills without having to accept the expensive riders

attached to them through the legislative process of "logrolling," the item
veto, it is argued, would significantly reduce congressional spending, while

at the same time allowing the President to sign otherwise desirable legislation
into law. 9 At least eight Presidents, including Presidents Reagan and Bush,
have advocated that the chief executive be given this tool to confront
effectively Congressional spending excesses.' 0 President Bush has gone even
further and has stated that if presented with the appropriate bill, he would
exercise item veto power as a test case."

5. See The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-119, 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. (101 Stat.) 754 [hereinafter Act] (codified throughout
2 and 42 U.S.C.). For a discussion of the amended statute, see Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal
Constitution: the Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 76 CAL. L. REV. 593 (1988). The author
explains that the exemption of mandatory spending from the automatic sequestration provisions
prevents the Act from achieving its stated goal of eliminating the federal deficit by 1991. Id.
at 596, 652-68.
6. See Roberts, supra note 3, at Fl.
7. See Paul R.Q. Wolfson, Note, Is a PresidentialItem Veto Constitutional?,96 YALE
L.J. 838, 838 (1987) (noting that "[a]s a solution to the perceived congressional aversion to
fiscal discipline, members of Congress, influential voices in the press, and President Reagan
have suggested that Congress grant the President an 'item veto' power over appropriations
bills."). The item veto is often referred to erroneously as the line-item veto; see also ROBERT
122 (1988)
. often erroneously called line-item veto-federal
appropriations bills are not itemized line by line. .. .") (emphasis in original); Calvin Bellamy,
Item Veto: Shield Against Deficits or Weapon of Presidential Power?, 22 VAL. U. L. REV.
J.

SPITZER, THE PRESIDENTIAL VETO: TOUCHSTONE OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY

(stating that "[t]he term item veto [is] .

.

557, at 557 n.1 (1988) (noting that "[t]he item veto is not limited to a 'line' and may include
whole paragraphs or sections of a legislative proposal.").
8. See AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE LEGISLATIVE ANALYSES, PROPOSALS FOR LINEITEM VETO AUTHORITY 1 (1984) (noting that item veto "would allow [the President] to veto
individual items of appropriations measures that he must now approve or reject in their
entirety.").
9. See Russell M. Ross & Fred Schwengel, An Item Veto for the President?, 12
PRESENTIA. STUD. Q. 66, 66 (1982) (asserting that item veto "would grant to the chief executive
the power to reject specific items within legislation passed by both Houses of Congress rather
than presenting the President with the necessity of accepting the entire bill or vetoing it in its
entirety.").

10. See Denise C. Twomey, Comment, The Constitutionality of a Line-item Veto: A
Comparison with Other Exercises of Executive Discretion not to Spend, 19 GOLDEN GATE U.
L. REV. 305, 309 n.20 (1989) (identifying Presidents who have expressed support for the item
veto); John W. Mashek, Sununu Sees PartisanStorms in 1991, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 12, 1990,
at 13 (noting that Bush has asked Congress for item veto).
11. See J. Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Four Faces of the Itein Veto: A Reply
to Tribe and Kurland, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 439, 447 (1990) (quoting President Bush in July
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The item veto has long been the focus of both political and academic
debate.12 Proponents of the item veto cite three primary justifications for
this so-called curative device to "restore" the balance of power between
the executive and legislative branches: first, the favorable experience of the
3
forty-three states that provide their governors with this budget-cutting tool; 4
second, the seeming inability of Congress to curb its own spending excesses;'
and third, such modern congressional innovations as riders and eleventhhour omnibus appropriations bills that, if vetoed in their entirety, would
effectively shut down the federal government.'
Item veto detractors counter by claiming first, that the state analogy is
of limited application to the federal legislative situation; 6 second, that
federal packaging of appropriations bills is not conducive to effective use
of the item veto; 7 third, that the vast majority of federal expenditures are

25, 1989 interview as stating: "I'd like to test [the item veto] the way it is. I can't quite find
the right case. I'm sure you're familiar with the theory that the President has that inherent
power, and if I found the proper, narrowly-defined case, I'd like to try that and let the courts
decide whether it's there."); Bush Seeks Chance to Try Line-item Veto, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct.
24, 1989, at 3 (quoting an administration official as stating that "Bush has decided that 'if
the Congress won't give [the item veto] to him, he wants to see if he has the authority to use
piecemeal vetoes without further authorization .... '").
12. See SPrrzER, supra note 7, at 126-29 (discussing history of item veto debate).
13. See, e.g., Alan J. Dixon, Line-Item Veto Controversy, 64 CONG. DIG. 259, 286 (1985)
(quoting Senator Dixon as stating that "[i]f a Federal item veto with majority override works
as well at the Federal level as it does in my own State of Illinois, it could save $27 billion a
year or more."); Ross & Schwengel, supra note 9, at 74 (stating that "[i]t is significant...
that in no state where the item veto authority has once been conferred upon the governor has
it subsequently been withdrawn."); Twomey, supra note 10, at 2 n.1 ("None of the 43 states
which currently include item veto provisions in their constitutions have ever acted to repeal
the provisions.").
14. See, Dixon, supra note 13, at 282-83 (asserting that "[]og-rolling, and packaging
good and bad programs into a single omnibus bill, have become a way of life.... Congress
will never resolve the deficit problems if it continues this 'business as usual' approach.").
15. See Ross & Schwengel, supra note 9, at 77 (positing that "[w]hen appropriations
bills are rushed through Congress in the closing days, and perhaps hours, of the legislative
session, as is often the case, the President has, for all practical purposes, no choice at all.");
see also Judith A. Best, The Item Veto: Would the Founders Approve?, 14 PRESIDENTMI L
STUD. Q. 183, 187 (1984) (stating that "proposals such as riders and pork barrel appropriations
have no other purpose than to intimidate the President, to emasculate the veto power, [and]
to foreclose the opportunity for reconsideration."); Alan J. Dixon, The Case for the LineItem Veto, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETrmcs & PuB. PoL'y 207, 221 (1985) (stating that "[t]he
legislative tactics that have eroded the President's veto power were uncommon when the
Constitution was written."); Richard A. Givens, The Validity of a Separate Veto of Nongermane Riders to Legislation, 39 TEmp. L.Q. 60 (1965) (asserting that "[tihere is no evidence
that the practice of attaching riders was foreseen at the time of the writing or adoption of
the Constitution.").
16. See Louis Fisher & Neal Devins, How Successfully Can the States' Item Veto be
Transferred to the President?, 75 GEo. L.J. 159, 161, 180, 186 (1986) (outlining "serious
deficiencies" of "state analogy").
17. See Bellamy, supra note 7, at 577-580 (comparing state and federal appropriations
processes and explaining why item veto would be a less effective tool to reduce federal
appropriations than it is to reduce state appropriations).
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mandatory and would thus be immune from the item veto;" and finally,
and perhaps most importantly, that the item veto would substantially rework
the separation of powers envisioned by the framers of the Constitution. 9

While literature on the item veto is extensive, 20 surprisingly little attention has been focused on how this tool, if conferred upon the President,
would be used in the day to day bargaining over legislative proposals
between the executive and legislative branches. 2 ' By relying upon the analytical tools advanced by public choice theorists, this article will employ
both static and dynamic legislative bargaining models to address this issue.
The conclusion reached from the analysis is that the item veto in practice
may have precisely the opposite of its intended effect of enabling the
President to curb congressional spending by carving out offensive pork
barrel riders from otherwise desired legislation. Instead, the item veto would

enable the President to influence substantially the direction and shape of
legislative policy, while surprisingly, it would offer the chief executive
relatively little opportunity to excise offensive special interest items.2
This article will first review the constitutional debate surrounding the
item veto. This review is necessary to understand the arguments both for
and against the item veto. Then, using the tools employed by public choice
theorists, this article will analyze the item veto by considering both static

18. See id. at 579-80 (explaining that entitlement programs and interest on public debt
are mandatory expenditures that would be immune from item veto).
19. See id. at 581-87 (discussing impact of item veto on balance of power between
President and Congress); Wolfson, supra note 7, at 851 (asserting that "[a] transfer of spending
power to the President would give him primary authority to set priorities for legislation....
As the Framers understood it, the legislature possessed the power of the purse as a guard
against executive power.").
20. For an extensive bibliography on the item veto, see HOUSE CoMM. ON RULEs, 99TH
CONO., 2D SESS., ITEM VETO: STATE EXPERIENCE AND ITS

APPLICATION TO THE FEDERAL

282-90 (Comm. Print 1986) [hereinafter Item Veto: State Experience].
21. One article that does explore how the dynamics of legislative bargaining may change
if item veto power is conferred upon President is Glen 0. Robinson, Public Choice Speculations
on the Item Veto, 74 VA. L. REv. 403 (1988). Professor Robinson analogizes the balance of
power between the executive and legislative branches to a bilateral monopoly and treats the
packaging of riders as a type of tying arrangement used by Congress to coerce the President
to accept its special interest items. Id. at 407-12. One interesting question raised by the analogy
is exactly what each branch of government is trying to maximize in the legislative bargaining
process. Certainly Congress as an institution has no incentive to seek presidential approval of
special interest items. The incentives lie with the individual Congressmen seeking to maximize
their political clout and support. See infra notes 184-87 and accompanying text. Professor
Robinson concludes that while he is not certain how successful the item veto will be in reducing
pork barrel legislation overall, even potential marginal reductions "are not to be spurned."
Robinson, supra, at 420. Professor Robinson recommends trying the item veto on a trial basis.
Id. at 421-22. If this article's predictions are correct, however, the more fundamental issue in
the item veto debate is not the extent of budget reductions that the item veto may achieve,
but rather, the extent to which the item veto will increase executive influence on general
matters of legislative policy. See infra notes 178-83 and accompanying text.
22. See generally infra notes 163-87 and accompanying text (discussing dynamic legislative
bargaining model).
SrrUATION,
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and dynamic models of the legislative bargaining process as each relates to
this innovative tool. Finally, this article will test the thesis that the item
veto may produce the opposite of its intended effect of carving out offensive
riders from otherwise desired legislation by considering studies that, involve
presidential impoundments and gubernatorial use of the item veto.
II.

CONSTITUnONAL ANALYSIS2

Both proponents and opponents of the item veto have looked to the
wording and history of the Constitution to support their respective positions
as to whether the framers, had they considered the issue, would have
conferred item veto power upon the President. 24 Item veto supporters have
argued that, in light of modern legislative practices such as logrolling,
attaching nongermane riders to legislation, and passing eleventh-hour omnibus appropriations bills, the item veto would merely serve to "restore"
Presidential veto power.Y These congressional practices, it is argued, involve

23. While the primary focus of this article is to analyze the item veto as a matter of
policy, rather than to assess the competing arguments whether the Constitution in its present
form provides the President with item veto authority, the logical starting place to begin the
item veto analysis is the Constitution itself. First, the Constitution provides the status quo or
backdrop against which a change in the separation of powers that the item veto would entail
must be assessed. Second, as shown below, the constitutional debate itself provides valuable
insights for analyzing the item veto as a matter of policy. While the insights from this analysis
are helpful, the issue whether the item veto is constitutional is only dispositive of the item
veto debate if the President tries to assert item veto authority through executive fiat or if
Congress tries to confer item veto power through ordinary legislation.
In the 99th Congress, Senator Mattingly introduced a bill, S.43, that would have conferred
upon the President item veto power through ordinary legislation on a two-year trial basis. See
Edward M. Kennedy, Line Item Veto Controversy, 64 CONG. DIG. 259, 266 (1985); Recent
Action in the Congress, 64 CONG. DIG. 265 (1985) [hereinafter Recent Action]; Mack Mattingly,
Line Item Veto Controversy, 64 CoNG. DIo. 259, 272 (1985). The bill was co-sponsored by 46
Senators. Recent Action, supra, at 265. If successful, the bill would have circumvented the
issue whether the President can veto items within an appropriations bill absent a constitutional
amendment by forcing Congress to divide all appropriations bills into discrete items before
presentment to the President. Kennedy, supra, at 268. This subterfuge would be unnecessary
if the item veto were enacted through a constitutional amendment. In addition, at least one
author has argued that the separate veto of a rider, or nongermane amendment; would
presently withstand constitutional muster without either a constitutional amendment or special
legislation. Givens, supra note 15, at 64.
24. Compare Best, supra note 15, at 188 (arguing that had framers considered issue,
they would have conferred item veto authority on President) with Mickey Edwards, The Case
Against the Line-Item Veto, I NoTR DAME J.L. ETcs & PuB. POL'Y 191, 196-97 (1985)
(stating that framers would have rejected item veto as undue encroachment by President on
legislative process).
25. See, e.g., Best, supra note 15, at 188 (asserting that "[i]t is reasonable that the
Founders would not find the item veto to be a dangerous innovation but rather a rehabilitation
of an original and essential check and balance."); Dixon, supra note 13, at 282 (stating "I
say restore because the truth is that the presidential veto is now a much weaker weapon than
it once was."); Ross & Schwengel, supra note 9, at 77 (stating that "[t]he item veto would
restore the veto power to the President.").
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a misappropriation of legislative power at the expense of the President. 26
In contrast, opponents contend that the item veto would result in an
unintended and undesirable shift in the balance of power from the legislative
branch, where power is relatively decentralized, to the executive branch,
where power is extremely centralized.27
A.

ConstitutionalHistory of Veto Power

The three primary sources that provide data from which to glean
historical support for these positions are the Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 28 the Federalist Papers, 29 and, of course, the Constitution
itself.3 0 It is impossible to discern from these documents, however, how the
framers would have reacted to the item veto, because none of the three
ever mentions the device.3 1 The debate surrounding the veto power ultimately
included in the Constitution, contained in Article 1, Section 7, centered
instead on three issues: first, whether to provide the President with an
absolute or qualified veto power;3 2 second, if qualified, what percentage
vote would be required for an override; 33 and third, whether the President

26. See Best, supra note 15, at 187; Givens, supra note 15, at 60-63 (arguing that because
framers did not anticipate legislative practice of attaching riders, Supreme Court should interpret
"bill" in Article I, § 7 of Constitution to mean "an interconnected piece of legislation
concerned with one or more related subjects.").
27. See The Committee on Federal Legislation, The Line Item Veto, 41 REc. ASS'N BAR
CITY N.Y. 367, 370 (1986) (positing that "the framers were naturally wary of consolidating
power in the one branch of government in which, by virtue of its unitary nature, power could
not be fragmented or otherwise internally checked."); see also Edwards, supra note 24, at
195-97; Robert J. Spitzer, The Item Veto Reconsidered, 15 PRpSIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 611, 612

(1985).
28. See MAx FARUAND, THE REcoRDs OF THE
(1966).

29. See THE
edition.

FEDERALIST

FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

1787, 4 vols.

(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). All cites hereinafter are to this

30. One additional primary source is contemporaneous correspondence by the framers.
In a letter to Thomas Jefferson, James Madison described the debate surrounding the proposed
veto power in these terms:
[S]ome contended for an absolute negative, as the only possible mean of reducing
to practice the theory of a free Government which forbids a mixture of the Legislative
& Executive powers. Others would be content with a revisionary power, to be
overruled by three fourths of both Houses. It was warmly urged that the judiciary
department should be associated in the revision. The idea of some was that a separate
revision should be given to the two departments-that if either objected two thirds,
if both, three fourths, should be necessary to overrule.
3 FARRAND, supra note 28, at 133. The idea of a revisionary power was ultimately rejected,
apparently with little or no debate. See SPrrZER, supra note 7, at 20.
31. See SPrrzER, supra note 7, at 123 (stating that "[nJo debate on an item veto appears
in the transcripts of the federal [constitutional] convention, and no formal proposal on the
subject was offered."); see also infra notes 37, 39.
32. See SPrrZER, supra note 7, at 11-12 (discussing debate over issue of providing
President with veto power).
33. Id. at 13.
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would exercise the veto power alone or in combination with one or more
members of the judiciary.Y As adopted, Article 1, Section 7 provides:
Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives
and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President of the United States; if he shall approve he shall sign it,

but if not be shall return it ....

3

36
Congress may override a presidential veto by a two-thirds vote.
37
Nowhere in the Constitution itself does the word "veto" even appear.
In the Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, the word appears, at
most, twice, 38 and in the Federalist Papers it appears only once. 39 This is
not fortuitous. The framers of the Constitution were well aware that the
veto power could be associated with its monarchical roots. 40 Both the
supporters of the Constitution and the antifederalists were heavily influenced'
by the works of Montisquieu and his emphasis on the importance of an
absolute separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches'.4

34. See id. at 13-14 (discussing counsel of revision proposal).
35. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 7.
36. Id. As presently interpreted, the art. I, § 7 veto power contains four variants. When
presented with a bill, the President can (1) sign it into law; (2) veto it, thus returning the
entire measure; or (3) allow the bill to become law without signature by failing to return it
within ten working days. See 135 CONG. Rlc. S14,387 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1989) (printing letter
from Professors Tribe and Kurland to Senator Kennedy on constitutional validity of item veto
absent amendment) [hereinafter Tribe and Kurland], reprinted in Sidak & Smith, supra note
11, at 437. The fourth variant, derived from the third, provides the President an absolute veto
when he chooses not to sign a bill and when "Congress by their Adjournment prevent [the
bill's] return." U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. See also Carl McGowan, The President's Veto
Power: An Important Instrument of Conflict in our Constitutional System, 23 SAN DIGo L.
Rav. 791, 817 (1986).
37. See U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 7. See also SPrrzER, supra note 7, at 17 (noting that
"[n]owhere in the Constitution does the word veto appear, even though the paragraph that
describes it is the second longest in the document.").
38. See SprrzER, supra note 7, at 17-18.
39. See Sidak & Smith, supra note 11, at 441 n.15 (asserting that "[t]o our knowledge,
the word 'veto' is used only once in the Federalist-and even then it is used as a label for a
type of executive power (the 'absolute negative' of the British monarch) that Hamilton
emphasized did not correspond to the lawmaking powers being conferred by the Constitution
upon the American President.") (citing THE FEDEmAsr No. 73, at 492, 498 (Alexander
Hamilton)).
40. See SprrzER, supra note 7, at 18 (observing that "[i]t is well understood that this
semantic ploy was no accident, but reflected a keen awareness of the monarchical roots of
this power and the resentment that its use by the king and his colonial governors had
engendered in America:").
41. See MAX FARAuD, THE FRAmING OF THE CONSTrrUTON OF THa UNrED STATES 4950 (1962) (noting that "Montesquieu, whose writings were taken as political gospel, had shown
the absolute necessity of separating the legislative, executive, and judicial powers."). For a
discussion of the framers' reliance upon the works of Montesquieu, see Abner J. Mikva,
Congress: The Purse, the Purpose, and the Power, 21 GA. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1986); 3 FARRAD,
supra note 28, at 133 (citing letter from Madison to Jefferson that is quoted supra note 30).
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The veto was seen as a potential encroachment of this necessary absolute
separation of powers. 42
A review of the constitutional history of the veto makes clear that, in
establishing "the qualified negative of the President, ' 43 the framers were
not guided by a single principle from which to discern their legislative
intent. While it is true that the framers sought to expand executive power
vis-a-vis the legislature, they sought to do so precisely because the drafters
of the Articles of Confederation, in their zealousness to guard against
executive excesses, went too far. 44
Three aspects of the Articles created what has been described aptly as
"headless" federal government: 45 the lack of an executive branch; the power
of any five states to block any proposed federal legislation; and the
requirement of unanimity among the states to pass an amendment to the
Articles.4 While a stronger federal government, and in particular the creation
of an executive branch, was essential to the survival of the young nation,
the framers of the Constitution nonetheless remained fearful of both legislative and executive excesses. The constitutional structure reflects these
balanced concerns.
The framers of the Constitution envisioned a republican government in
which "the legislative authority, necessarily, predominates. " 47 The framers
chose an elected legislative body rather than direct lawmaking by the
electorate because an elected body, they hoped, would "break and control
the violence of faction. '4 James Madison feared that in a democratic
government, majorities would rapidly form "who are united and actuated
by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights
of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community. '49 But Madison saw faction as something to be controlled
rather than eliminated because faction, he believed, was firmly rooted in
liberty.5 0

42. See SPITzER, supra note 7, at 22 (noting that "[a]s a legislative power given to the
executive, the veto was seen as contradicting the maxim, derived from Montesquieu, that the
best way to avoid the abuse of power is to divide it.").
43. Tim FEDERALIST No. 73, at 494 (Alexander Hamilton).
44. See EDWARD C. MASON, THE VETO POWER ITS ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT AND FUNCTION
IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1789-1889) 19-23 (1967) (explaining that framers
of Constitution vested executive with veto power in response to inadequacies of executive
power in Articles of Confederation);

VERNON
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(1936), reprinted in Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the
Judiciary United States Senate, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 137, 138 (1984) (noting that "[w]ithin a
few years the weakness inherent in a 'headless' government became apparent."); see also
FAxRAND, supra note 41, at 49-50 (discussing recognized need for separate executive branch).
45. See WILKINSON, supra note 44, at 138.
46. See SPrrZER, supra note 7, at 10.
47. Tax FEDERALIST No. 51, at 350 (James Madison).
48. Tax FEDERALIST No. 10, at 56 (James Madison).
49. Id. at 57.
50. See id. at 58-59.
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Madison believed and hoped that an elected legislature would "refine
and enlarge the public views."'" Although the elected legislature itself might
fall subject to the vice of factions, he hoped that the sheer size of the
federal government, as opposed to that of smaller state governments, would
for "men of factious
counteract this tendency by making it more difficult
' 52
tempers" to "betray the interests of the people.
The framers created two devices to make passage of laws adverse to
the public interest more difficult. First, the framers made lawmaking more
difficult by establishing a bicameral legislature, in which one house will
have "immediate dependence on, [and] an intimate sympathy with the
people," 53 and the other house will allow greater time for reflection and
deliberation.5 4 This structure protects the public interest because each house
must agree on the language of each bill before passage. 55 Second, the
framers granted the President a qualified veto subject to a two-thirds
majority override by both houses of Congress.5 6 Explaining these additional
checks on the legislature, Madison wrote, "[als the weight of the legislative
authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of 57the
executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified.
The veto, as ultimately adopted, reflects the delicate balance forged by
the founders between the executive and legislative branches. Alexander
Hamilton, who favored a strong executive, initially argued for an absolute
veto.58 Madison, in contrast, favored a "qualified negative," claiming that
the President would rarely exercise this power without some support in
Congress in the first instance.5 9 Ultimately, even Hamilton was persuaded
that a qualified veto would be "more effectual," as it "would be less apt
to offend." 6 In addition to providing the President with a qualified veto
power, the framers settled upon a two-thirds voting requirement in each
house for an override with relatively little debate. 61 The framers ultimately

51. Id. at 62.
52. Id.

53. Tm FEDERALST No. 52, at 355 (James Madison).
54. See THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 418-19 (James Madison).

55. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
56. See id.
57. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 350 (James Madison). For a discussion of the inherent
dilemma created by the combined democratic and antimajoritarian aspects of the Madisonian
model of government, see Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment

Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 2-3 (1971).
58. See 1 FuANr, supra note 28, at 107.

59. See id. at 99-100 (quoting Madison as stating that "if a proper proportion of each
branch should be required to overrule the objections of the Executive, it would serve the same
purpose as an absolute negative. It would rarely ever happen that the Executive constituted as
ours is proposed to be would, have firmness eno' to resist the Legislature, unless backed by

a certain part of the body itself.").
60. THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 498 (Alexander Hamilton). For an informative summary
of the debate at the constitutional convention surrounding whether the President should be
afforded an absolute or qualified veto, see SPrrZR, supra note 7, at 11-13.
61. See SPrrzER, supra note 7, at 12.
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rejected the proposal that the President share the veto power with members
62
of the judiciary.
Two themes dominated the discussions at the constitutional convention
concerning the use of the veto. The veto was seen as a tool, first, to enable
the President to protect himself from legislative encroachment,63 and second,
to prevent laws that are "unwise in their principle, or incorrect in their
form."6 4 Hamilton thus described the veto as a device to prevent "an
immediate attack upon the constitutional rights of the Executive, or in a
6
case in which the public good was evidently and palpably sacrificed.1
In light of this constitutional history, it is by no means clear whether
the framers would have supported the item veto. Because the framers were
motivated by conflicting principles, all one can absolutely discern is the
compromise that was ultimately reached. Several authors nonetheless have
claimed that this compromise, reflected in the wording of the Constitution
itself, supports their arguments for an item veto.

B. ConstitutionalArguments Over Item Veto
One author, Richard Givens, has argued that the President already may
have the consitutional authority to veto nongermane amendments to legislation because the word "bill" in Article 1, Section 7 was not intended to
mean a single piece of legislation embracing multiple subjects.6 His argument
is fairly straightforward. At the time the Constitution was written, individual
bills generally consisted of only one subject. 67 Givens contends that because
the framers did not anticipate the legislative practice of riders, there was

62. Id. at 13-14.
63. Id. at 15.
64. 1 FARRAND, supra note 28, at 139 (quoting James Madison); see also SPrIZER, supra
note 7, at 17.
65. THE FEDERALST No. 73, at 497 (Alexander Hamilton); see also SPrIzER, supra note
7, at 15 (stating that "[a]gain and again in the [constitutional] convention's consideration of
the veto power, one central theme persistently surfaced: the veto as a device of executive selfprotection against encroachments of the legislature."). For the first forty years following the
enactment of the Constitution, Presidents limited their use of the veto power to acts violating
executive prerogatives or otherwise violating the Constitution. See WIKINSON, supra note 44,
at 154 and sources contained therein. Andrew Jackson was the first President to use the veto
as a device to substitute executive judgment on issues of policy for that of Congress. Id. at
159.
66. See Givens, supra note 15, at 62; but see Richard A. Riggs, Separation of Powers:
CongressionalRiders and the Veto Power, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 735, 745 (1973) (noting that
"[tihere were no debates over the meaning of the word [bill] at the constitutional convention,
and no other contemporaneous recognition that its interpretation would present any difficulties
has been found.") (footnote omitted).
67. See Givens, supra note 15, at 60 (asserting that "[t]here is no evidence that the
practice of attaching riders was foreseen at the time of the writing or adoption of the
Constitution."); see also Dixon, supra note 15, at 221; Ross & Schwengel, supra note 9, at
67; but see SPITZER, supra note 7, at 124 (observing that although attaching unrelated riders
to legislation was practiced in Britain before Constitution's enactment, evidence is inconclusive
whether framers of Constitution were aware of such practice).
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no reason for the framers to specify in the Constitution that "bills" could
not include multiple subjects. 68 Therefore, Givens argues, the Constitution
should not be interpreted as preventing the President from vetoing a rider
attached to an unrelated bill where the69 President would not have accepted
the rider independently from that bill.

Givens claims that the existence of House and Senate rules prohibiting
70

nongermane amendments supports his construction of the word "bill."

Ironically, however, the very existence of these rules appears to undercut
Givens's argument. If, in fact, the word "bill" means "an interconnected
piece of legislation dealing with related subject matters,' 71 then the House
and Senate germaneness rules would be unnecessary because nongermane
amendments would be voidable. However, even assuming that Givens is
correct in asserting that the framers could not have anticipated the practice
of attaching nongermane riders to legislation, which is debated, 72 and that
their failure to anticipate the practice warrants invalidating nongermane
amendments, it does not follow that the President should be vested with

separate authority to veto such items. An equally plausible solution would
be to require judicial enforcement of the germaneness rule.
The argument favoring executive enforcement over judicial enforcement
is based on expediency.73 Obviously it would be easier for a President to

68. See Givens, supra note 15, at 63; see also CHARSLES J. ZINN, HOUSE COM. ON =in
JUDIciARY, THE VETO POWER OF THE PRESIDENT 34 (Comm. Print 1951) (asking whether "[i]n
the absence of any informative debates in the [constitutional] Convention, is it assuming too
much to hold that the delegates thought of that term [bill] as meaning a legislative instrument
setting forth one or more propositions of law, all related, however, to a single subject
matter?"); Ross & Schwengel, supra note 9, at 67 (arguing that "lilt is at least possible that
... those attending the [Constitutional] Convention gave the term 'bill' a much narrower
construction than has since been applied to the term. It may have been envisioned that a bill
would be concerned with only one specific subject and that subject would be clearly stated in
the title."); but see Eugene Gressman, Is the Item Veto Constitutional?,64 N.C. L. REv. 819,
819 (1986) (asserting that "[b]y long usage and plain meaning, 'Bill' means any singular, entire
piece of legislation in the form in which it was approved by the two Houses.").
69. See Givens, supra note 15, at 64 (arguing that "such a veto, if upheld in Congress,
would appear to stand an excellent chance of being upheld in the courts as well.").
70. Givens, supra, note 15, at 63. At present, only the House rules prolibit nongermane
riders. See WrtutAm N. ESKRIDGE & PiuP P. FiicKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEOISLATION:
STATUTES AND TIE CREATION OF PuBuc POLICY (1988) at 25-26 note v. ("Absent a unanimous
consent agreement, a senator may propose any number of amendments, including those wholly
unrelated to the subject matter of the bill. (House Rule XVI, in contrast, limits amendments
to those which are 'germane,' or related, to the subject of the bill.)"). The rules prohibiting
introduction of nongermane amendments to which Givens was referring can be found at H.R.
Res. 46, 44th Cong., Ist Sess., R.16, No. 7 (1876); S. Res. 18, 48th Cong., 1st Sess., R.16
(1884); see also Riggs, supra note 66, at 743 (arguing that "[t]he difficulty with [Givens's]
approach ... is that the rules [prohibiting nongermane amendments] do not provide that a
bill loses its quality as a single bill when a nongermane provision is added; they merely provide
that such amendments should not be introduced.").
71. See Givens, supra note 15, at 63.
72. See SPITZER, supra note 7, at 124.
73. Cf. Jeffrey G. Knowles, Note, Enforcing the One-Subject Rule: The Case for a
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veto a rider than to wait for judicial enforcement of the construction of
the word "bill." As yet, there is no judicial decision prohibiting the
attachment of nongermane riders, notwithstanding the House and Senate
rules.7 4 Moreover, no procedural rule of Congress can alter the .meaning of
constitutional language. 75 If nongermane amendments were ruled invalid,
however, then the strategic advantage to attaching them to bills, regardless
of which branch has the power to enforce the rule, would be reduced.
The item veto, by allowing the President to effectively sever items from
larger bills, appears to remove the incentive for legislators to incorporate
such items into those bills. With the item veto, all legislation, however
packaged, would consist of individual items subject to separate veto power
from the standpoint of both the President and legislators. The policy
question, then, dealt with below, is what impact this is likely to have on
the process of legislative bargaining.
While Givens limits his argument to nongermane amendments, distinguishing proposals to grant the President item veto authority over appropriations bills on the ground that appropriations bills involve one related
subject, 76 two authors, J. Gregory Sidak and Thomas A. Smith, have recently

77
advanced a similar argument in support of a more generalized item veto.
Since the framers neither anticipated "riders" nor the now common legislative practices of attaching large scale pork barrel appropriations to general
appropriations bills7 I and passing omnibus appropriations bills near the close
of each session, such that if the President exercises his veto power he
effectively closes the government, 79 it is argued that the framers' failure to
restrict these practices should not mean that the President is constitutionally
obligated to respect them.so
In fact, however, the framers' silence on the issues of riders, large scale
pork barrel appropriations within single bills, and delayed passage of
appropriations bills, neither confirms nor denies how the framers would
have reacted to these now common legislative practices. These practices
evolved, at least in part, because the Constitution by its wording did not

Subject Veto, 38 HASTINGs L.J. 563, 586 (1987) (arguing that gubernatorial enforcement of
single subject rule through veto power over nongermane amendments is more efficient than
judicial enforcement of single subject rule).
74. See McGowan, supra note 36, at 810-11 n.103.
75. See Riggs, supra note 66, at 743.
76. Givens, supra note 15, at 63.
77. See Sidak & Smith, supra note 11, at 466-74.
78. See Sidak & Smith, supra note 11, at 472 (noting that "[w]e do not know how the
framers would have advised the President to respond to the kind of legislative bundling that
is now standard practice, for this practice, according to President Hayes, 'did not prevail until
more than forty years after the adoption of the Constitution."'); see also Best, supra note 15,
at 187 (positing that "[s]ince the Founding ....
[t]he legislature has adopted the practice of
adding riders to bills and in particular legislative riders and pork-barrel appropriations to vital
bills.").
79. See Ross & Schwengel, supra note 9, at 77.
80. See Sidak & Smith, supra note 11, at 474.
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prevent them. Instead, the compromise reached by the framers and embodied
in Article 1, Section 7, by its plain wording requires the President either to
accept or to reject bills as packages, the content of which is determined
entirely by Congress. Thus, Professors Laurence H. Tribe and Phillip B.
Kurland, in addressing the item veto question, concluded that the Constitution, in its present form, provides the President no opportunity for a post
hoc audit of bills in the form of an item veto. 81 Assuming Professors Tribe
and Kurland are correct in stating that the Constitution's specific wording
does not provide the President with item veto power, the issue remains
whether the item veto is consistent with the constitutional structure.
Senator Dixon has argued that his proposed constitutional amendment
that would have conferred item veto power upon the President subject to
simple majority override is in accordance with constitutional principles
because "the fact that a bill passes Congress is supposed to mean that there
is majority support for that bill, including every item in it."' 82 This argument
disregards the constitutional scheme. Just because Congress alone determines
the package of items that form a bill, there is no reason to assume that a
majority of either or both houses supports each provision contained in every
bill. Rather, as shown below,83 supporters of a bill, even a bill that is a
matter of general interest but that does not yet have majority support in
each house, will engage in compromises in the course of legislative bargaining. Those compromises will include agreeing to attach items which as
independent bills would not garner majority support, in exchange for votes.
While these compromises increase the number of special interest items
presented to the President, they also increase the prospect of procuring
desired general interest legislation. Congress, and not the President, determines the content of bills under the constitutional scheme. Therefore, the
fact that a majority in each House of Congress would not have supported
every special interest item contained in a bill had that item been voted on
as an independent piece of proposed legislation does not mean that the
President separately can disapprove that item yet approve the remaining
items in the bill.
A variety of congressional practices consistent with the constitutional
scheme have increased the opportunities for such legislative compromises.
Numerous procedural hurdles to the passage of legislation, in addition to
the substantial power given to a minority in Congress through the presidential veto power,8 enable minorities in opposition to proposed bills, even

81. See Tribe & Kurland, supra note 36 (concluding that "[no provision is made for
vetoing a portion of a bill or other measure, as opposed to the whole.").
82. Dixon, supra note 15, at 223. Senator Dixon introduced the bill through joint
resolution in the Ist Session of the 98th Congress. Id. at 208 n.8 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 163-87 and accompanying text (discussing dynamic model and how
it is affected by item veto).
84. See CHARLEs 0. JONES, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY 94-95
(2d ed. 1977) (noting that presidential veto power represents substantial minority power because
two-thirds of both houses is required to override a veto).
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those bills with substantial or majority support, to force compromises in
their favor. 5 For example, the filibuster in the Senate was used to help
defeat proposed civil rights legislation until 1964.6 In addition, the committee structure in both houses can be used to thwart legislation with
majority support. An adverse committee chair can send a bill to a subcommittee that the chair knows will defeat it by obstructing hearings or by
managing to schedule votes at times when the bill's opponents will have the
greatest advantage. 7 Finally, House Rules Committee procedures give individual Congressmen significant power to slow down or even stop a bill
which has substantial or even majority support.88 These and other practices
give individual legislators who do not support a particular bill tremendous
power to exact substantive compromises or even to attach riders in exchange
for expediting passage.89
While these practices may give individual legislators seemingly disproportionate power, they also reflect the Madisonian vision that rapid formation of majority factions is to be feared. These practices allow well
placed representatives of minority groups who oppose particular legislative
proposals to force compromises that will soften the adverse impact of the
proposed legislation.
Although it is by no means certain how the framers would have reacted
to a proposal nbt before them, it is apparent that the item veto would
significantly compromise some of the protections given to minority interests.
If devices such as the qualified veto, the filibuster, and the House Rules
Committee procedures are useful in enabling minority interests to slow down
or stop legislation supported by rapidly formed majoritarian "factions" by
enabling those groups to coerce substantive changes to bills or to add riders
as a precondition to passage, then the item veto may work to defeat some
of these protections.9 If those compromises or additions to legislation given

85. See id. at 96-97 (describing legislative processes in Congress that can require no fewer
than fifty to sixty majorities to form at various junctures before a complex piece of legislation

is approved for presentment).
86. See id. at 98 (explaining that to invoke cloture to defeat filibuster, sixteen Senators
must sign petition and, until 1975, two-thirds of those Senators present needs to approve it;
in 1975 the cloture rule was amended to require three-fifths for approval except in cases of a
rule change, when two-thirds is still required).

87. Id. at 97.
88. For a discussion of some of these procedures, see

ESKRIDGE

& FRiCKEY, supra note

70, at 13-14; see also House Rules XXVII, XXIV and XI; PETER H. AR~ASON, AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT: STRATEGY AND CHOICE 367 (1981); MICHAEL T. HAYES, Lobbyists and Legislators:
A Theory of Political Markets 36 (1981) (noting "antimajoritarian" aspect of practices discussed

in text).
89. See HAYES, supra note 88, at 153-54 (discussing proposals to abolish coercive
practices).
90. One could argue that, in fact, the Madisonian fear of "factions" was exaggerated
and that such practices as "riders" demonstrate that the real aggrandizement of power has
not been composed of majoritarian factions adverse to the public good, but rather with special
interests strategically situated to coerce majorities into offering compromises in their favor.

Whether that is, in fact true, may be a test of the Madisonian model's strength rather than
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in exchange for the support of well-situated opponents to a bill are subject
to a separate' item veto, then such support may not be forthcoming in the
future despite any proffered compromises.
Implicit in the constitutional debate over the item veto is the idea that
one form of compromise, namely that resulting in change to the substantive
content of a bill as a precondition to support, is a legitimate byproduct of
the Madisonian vision, while another form, namely bribery that results in
riders, is not. Whether or not this assumption is valid, the next section will
demonstrate that the item is an ill-conceived device to safeguard the former
but prevent the latter form of bargaining.
In short, there is no obvious way to maintain the benefits of allowing
minority interests to force compromises in their favor without also incurring
the costs. If the President can item veto undesirable special interest riders,
he may effectively prevent those legitimate compromises that a bill's supporters need in order to gain majority support. With the good comes the
bad.
Whether or not the Constitution presently provides the President with
item veto authority, the constitutional analysis leaves us with the following
insight: Without the item veto, we may get more general interest bills along
with more pork barrel items; with the item veto, we may get fewer general
interest bills along with fewer pork barrel items. This insight provides the
nucleus for analysis under public choice theory.9 '
III.

PUBLIC CHOICE ANALYSIS OF THE ITEM VETO

Although constitutional analysis is the logical starting place to analyze
the item veto, all but the most ardent item veto supporters acknowledge
that the Constitution in its present form does not provide the President
with this authority.92 The question remains, however, whether adopting the
item veto represents a sound policy choice. Using the insights advanced by
public choice theorists, as applied to this innovative tool, this section will
address that issue.
Public choice theorists attempt to predict the types of legislation likely
to result if certain assumptions are made about the participants in the
legislative process. All players in the legislative arena are assumed to be
rational self-interest maximers. 93 Public choice theorists analogize Congress

its weakness. The feared violence of factions may be reduced precisely because of these existing
protections for minority interests.
91. One remaining constitutional argument that requires an understanding of the dynamic
public choice analysis will be addressed infra at notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
92. See Dixon, supra note 13, at 282 (explaining need for constitutional amendment to
confer item veto on President).
93. See Arthur S. Goldberg, Social Determinism and Rationality as Bases of Party

Identification, 63 AM. POL. Sci. R v. 5 (1969) (describing concept of rationality). The author
states that:

Put most simply, being rational in a decision situation consists in examining the
alternatives with which one is confronted, estimating and evaluating the likely
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to a marketplace in which public interest groups and lobbyists attempt to
procure favorable legislation to benefit their constituents.9
Using this analogy, legislators are the suppliers of legislation, and the
public, interest groups, and lobbyists are the demanders. Public choice
theorists assert that individuals will seek to procure legislation only when
the benefits to them of pursuing that legislation exceed the costs. 9s Similarly,
on the supply side, legislators will provide legislative benefits when it best
96
serves their goals, including their primary objective of being re-elected.

consequences of each, and selecting that alternative which yields the most attractive
set of expectations. . . . All individuals are assumed to act so as to try to maximize
expected value. In this sense all are equally rational. However, there is room for
error in these calculations. Individuals may, therefore, vary in their effective rationality.
Id. at 5. (emphasis in original). For a further discussion on the concept of rationality in
decisionmaking, see ANTHONY DOWNS, AN EcONOMc THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 4-11 (1957).
94. Earlier pluralist theorists posited that Congress was merely a conduit through which
special interest groups bargained to achieve their own legislative compromises. See EARL
LATHAM, THE GROUP BASIS OF POLITICS 35 (1952) (asserting that "[t]he legislature referees the
group struggle, ratifies the victories of the successful coalitions, and records the terms of
surrenders, compromises, and conquests in the form of statutes."); THEoDoRE J. Lowl, THE
PoLrrcs or DISORDER (1971) at xviii-xix (stating that "[t]he basis of pluralism and political
quiescence is the organized group and group interactions, with political man holding the whole
together through delegation and negotiation."). For an interesting pluralist analysis of the
passage of the Hawley-Smoot Bill, see ELMER E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES AND
THE TARIFF, A STUDY OF FREE PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN PREassURE POLITICS, AS SHOWN IN THE
1929-1930 REvIsION oF Tm TARIFF (1935). The author provides an early insight into the
logrolling process, explaining that while negotiating the tariff "the fear of retaliation is the
basis of the strategy of reciprocal non-interference." Id. at 140. Through this process of
mutual non-interference among special interests, and the failure of groups harmed by the
tariffs to form effective lobbies, id. at 222, the overall bill was actually harmful to the
economy as a whole. Id. at 283. Unlike pluralists who viewed legislators as referees in the
struggle among interest groups, public choice theorists instead contend that legislators and
lobbyists have a unique symbiotic relationship resulting in legislation that benefits both parties.
See RAYMoND A. BAUER ET AL., AMERICAN BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY 456-57 (1972) (arguing
that "the appropriate general model is not one of linear causality, but a transactional one,
which views all the actors in the situation as exerting continuous influence on each other. All
the actors are to some extent in a situation of mutual influence and interdependence.").
95. See generally HAYES, supra note 88, at 64-68. This is simply another way of saying
that individuals are rational self-interest maximizers. This simple insight explains a fundamental
tenet of public choice theory, namely that group behavior can be described only in terms of
the motives of the group's members. See ARANsON, supra note 88, at 21 (asserting that "[a]
group can have no goal apart from those goals that individual members of the group might
pursue."). As will be seen infra at note 97, the fundamental problem explained by public
choice theory is that it is often rational for individuals within a group to pursue goals that in
the aggregate are detrimental to the group as a whole.
96. MoRIus P. FIORINA, REPRESENTATIVES, ROLL CALLS, AND CONsTrrUENcis 31 (1974)
(noting that "[e]mpirically goals are enormous. Reelection, legislative influence, prestige, policy,
higher office, public service-all may play their part. But we would argue that reelection is
the primary goal that the constituency controls: the district gives and the district can take

away.");
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16 (1974) (stating that

"[t]he electoral goal ... has to be the proximate goal of everyone, the goal that must be
achieved over and over if other ends are to be entertained.") (emphasis in original).
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This article will employ two models of the legislative process derived
from these assumptions. The first, "static," model employs a four box
matrix to explain why it is possible that with both sides, the suppliers and
the demanders, acting rationally in the legislative arena, the end result may
be an abundance of special interest legislation that in the aggregate imposes
high costs on all members of society with no apparent corresponding
benefit.97 This is the problem that the item veto is designed to cure. The
static model will further demonstrate why the item veto appears to be a
uniquely acceptable solution to this problem. The second, "dynamic," model
will build upon the static model to show that, assuming again that all
players behave rationally, there is little reason to believe that the item veto
will achieve its proponents' stated goal of reducing undesirable pork barrel
legislation. Instead, the item veto would rework a fundamental shift in the
balance of power, providing the President with powerful opportunities to
influence the direction and shape of legislative priorities, while affording
him surprisingly little opportunity to excise the dreaded pork.
A.

The Static Model

The tendency of Congress to produce legislation that in the aggregate
leaves everyone worse off, called "Pareto inferior" legislation," stems from
two sources. On the demand side, individuals who would benefit from
collective governmental action realize that others will also benefit and, thus,
"hold out" in their lobbying efforts to procure such legislation. They
instead wait for others to lobby on their behalf. Law and economics scholars
have labelled this the "free-rider problem." 99 On the supply side, Congressmen often realize that legislation almost always provides benefits to some
constituents but imposes costs on others. Behaving rationally, Congressmen
will respond to these "conflictual" situations by either declining to provide
any legislation or by providing the facade of meaningful legislation in the
form of delegation. 00

97. See William H. Riker & Steven Brains, The Paradox of Vote Trading, 67 AM. PoL.
Sc. REv. 1235, 1236 (1973) (stating that "[t]his paradox [of vote trading] has the property
that, while each trade is individually advantageous to the traders, the sum of the trades is

disadvantageous to everybody, including the traders themselves."). But cf. JAms M. BUCHANAN
& GoDRoN TuInoCK, THE CALcULus OF CONSENT 145 (1965) (explaining that while irdividuals
with inadequate incentives to lobby against legislation imposing slight "externalities" onto

them are disadvantaged by such legislation, those same individuals may benefit overall by
legislative process because more than half the time they may be beneficiaries of legislation

imposing externalities onto others).
98. See Riker & Brains, supra note 97, at 1236 (analyzing why vote trading yields Pareto
inferior legislation).
99. See RacIR.D A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 147-66 (1976)
(discussing free-rider problem); see also HAYES, supra note 88, at 133; MANcuR OLSON, Tim
Looic OF CoI cTvE ACTION 21 (1971).
100. See HAYES, supra note 88, at 28 (noting that "[t]hrough the delegation of broad,

discretionary authority, legislators not only avoid having to choose among conflicting interests,
with the attendant risk of electoral punishment by the losers, but through the appearance of
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Two public choice theorists, James Q. Wilson and Michael T. Hayes,
have used these insights to create a model of four legislative categories
designed to predict which supply and demand configurations produce too
much public action as well as which ones produce too little.' 0' While this
analysis helps to provide an analytical framework, the more important issue
for purposes of the item veto debate involves the relationships between and
among certain of these legislative categories. This section will first outline
the factors that affect the supply and demand for legislation in each of the
four categories: distributed benefits/distributed costs, distributed benefits/
concentrated costs, concentrated benefits/distributed costs, concentrated
benefits/concentrated costs. This section and the next will then explain how
the item veto will affect the process of joining together legislation from
these various categories and what the implications are for the overall
procurement of desired legislation.
For simplicity, Wilson and Hayes divide the benefits associated with
public goods into general benefits to the public at large,'0 for example,
defense, and narrow or special interest benefits, 03 for example, an industrial

reform they may successfully appease those demanding change."). In Lows, supra note 94,
the author criticizes delegation as a means by which politicians avoid dealing with critical
political issues. The author explains:
A bad program is a government response to an urgent demand that expresses the
appropriate sentiments (for example, "put an end to poverty") but does not direct
the coercive powers of the state clearly and effectively toward the pathology that
activated the demand. Because the pressure is on, and good liberals feel they must
have the program, they formulate it vaguely, delegate great discretion to the administrator, and expect him to work out the actual program in cahoots with all
contestants.... But meanwhile, the energy behind the demands that go into the
enactment is bought off, and the discovery that it is bought off usually comes too
late to do anything about the program. This buying off is relatively easy, because
new and inexperienced leaders are simply ignorant of what they are in for when
they interact with governments and politicians. In this manner, a premature, vague
government response in a bad program is far worse than no government response
at all.
Id. at 59; see also id. at 179-80 (describing process by which establishmeni of Council of
Environmental Quality enabled Congress during Nixon administration to avoid setting up
meaningful environmental protection laws through facade of action). Lowi contends that "[i]t
is obviously better not to have any program at all than to give the sense of having one, and
later having it revealed as an ineffectual and privilege-prone program that brings the entire
governmental apparatus into question." Id. at 180.
101. See generally HAYES, supra note 88, at 99-126. While Wilson first posited these four
categories, Hayes, relying upon the works of several public choice theorists, has substantially
developed the original model; JA S Q. WILSON, PoLricAL ORGANATIONs 332-37 (1973).
102. See HAYEs, supra note 88, at 41 (describing nonexcludability as distinguishing public
from private goods); WILSON, supra note 101, at 331-32 (noting that goods conferring widely
distributed benefits may or may not be "collective goods" that provide benefits that are
nonexcludable); see also ARANsoN, supra note 88, at 79-80 (describing attributes of collective
goods, including jointness of supply and jointness of consumption).
103. See HAYES, supra note 88, at 42 (noting that "[flor small groups, however, the share
of the collective benefit going to each member may be sufficient to outweigh their shares of
the cost of providing the good."); WILSON, supra note 101, at 331.
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subsidy or tariff. Similarly, Wilson and Hayes divide the costs associated
with public goods into those that are distributed widely, for example, the
fifty-five mile-per-hour speed limit, and those that are distributed narrowly,
for example, rent control or socialized medicine. 0 4 While the costs and
benefits of most public goods fall between these extremes, 05 these categories
are useful in setting up the analytical paradigm.
The difficulty with categorizing public goods between the extremes of
conferring narrowly distributed and widely distributed benefits or imposing
narrowly distributed or widely distributed costs is exacerbated by the fact
that it is strategically beneficial for special interest groups to characterize
special interest goods, for example a particular defense contract, as benefiting the general public, for example by claiming that it will help the
national defense.' 0 6 Professor Glen 0. Robinson has offered a useful definition that helps to avoid this problem:
We can roughly define 'public goods' as those in which there is
some symmetry in the distribution of benefits and costs (within
some near-term time period), whereas 'private goods' are those
where distribution of benefits and costs is asymmetrical; benefits
are concentrated in a particular geographic region or special group,
whereas costs are distributed more broadly over the general population. 0 7
The traditional view of Congress is that of legislators following their
mandate collectively to supply goods benefiting the general public and
bargaining only as to detail.'10 The irony highlighted by public choice theory
is that individual members of society are least likely to lobby for such
goods.' °9 Because no one can be excluded from the benefits of such classic
104. See WiisoN, supra note 101, at 331 (explaining that "[a] cost may be widely
distributed (as with the general tax burden, generally rising crime rates, the widespread practice
of some objectionable act such as the sale of obscene literature) or it may be narrowly
concentrated (as with a fee or impost paid by a particular industry or locality or a highway
construction program that destroys a particular community)), see also HAxYs, supra note 88,
at 65 (stating that "[c]osts of a given issue may be widely distributed ... or narrowly
concentrated.").
105. See Robinson, supra note 21, at 408-09 and authorities cited.
106. See ARANSON, supra note 88, at 91 (explaining that while defense is characterized by
its proponents as a public good, in fact, defense contractors largely back defense lobbying
precisely because of "redistributive" benefits).
107. Robinson, supra note 21, at 408-09.
108. See ARANSON, supra note 88, at 354 (positing that "in an idealized model of
lawmaking ... senators and representatives would be instructed by the electoral process as to
what level of which public goods ... constituents wanted produced .... They would then
enter the Congress, thrash out the details, and hand over appropriately fashioned bills to the
president . . ").
109. See generally OLsoN, supra note 99, at 1-65 (assuming individuals behave rationally,
they are least likely to form groups that seek to obtain benefits that are widely distributed,
and more likely to form small groups that seek to'obtain benefits that are narrowly conferred
upon the group members); see also WILSON, supra note 101, at 23-24 (stating that "Olson
shows that it makes little sense to join an organization above a certain size if one's sole motive
is to increase perceptibly the organization's chances of achieving its goals.").
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public goods as a lighthouse or defense, individuals will hold out in their
lobbying efforts to procure such legislation, waiting for others to do so on
their behalf. 1 0 Because everyone engages in this behavior, goods providing
benefits to the general public tend to be undersupplied."' In other words,
while everyone benefits from them, no one is willing to incur the necessary
costs to procure them.
Alternatively, there is a stronger incentive to lobby for goods that
provide narrow and direct benefits to identifiable groups." 2 The hold out

phenomenon is not eliminated altogether, but it is reduced to the extent
that individuals can be excluded from the group benefiting from the legisn4

lation." 3 The problem here is analogous to that of "cheaters" in a cartel.
To avoid having potential beneficiaries of narrow benefit legislation "cheat"

by not contributing to lobbying efforts, special interest lobbyists will try,
where possible, to make the legislative benefits divisible and excludable.'

The problem with lobbying incentives is the same with respect to the

costs of collectively supplied goods as it is with respect to the benefits." 6

For public goods with widely distributed costs, one would expect minimal
lobbying in opposition, just as one would expect minimal lobbying in support
of goods conferring widely distributed benefits.

17

Similarly, for goods

imposing costs on a narrow group, one would expect greater lobbying in
opposition, subject to the same free-rider or "cheating" problem that occurs

110. See OLSON, supra note 99, at 21 (asserting that "[t]hough all of the members of the
group ... have a common interest in obtaining [the] collective benefit, they have no common
interest in paying the cost of providing that collective good. Each would prefer that the others
pay the entire cost, and ordinarily would get any benefit provided whether he had borne part
of the cost or not."); see also HAYEs, supra note 88, at 90 (claiming that "[w]idely distributed
benefits or costs would tend to affect large, diffuse groups vulnerable to the free rider problem,
whereas concentrated benefits and costs would be more likely to generate activity by organized
groups.").
111. See OLSON, supra note 99, at 35 (explaining that "[t]his tendency toward suboptimality
is due to the fact that a collective good is, by definition, such that other individuals in the
group cannot be kept from consuming it once any individual in the group has provided it for
himself."); see also HAYES, supra note 88, at 133 (concluding that "the supply of public goods
will inevitably be suboptimal as a result of the free rider problem.").
112. See OLSON, supra note 99, at 35 (concluding that, "[a]ccordingly, the larger the
group, the farther it will fall short of providing an optimal amount of a collective good.")
(emphasis deleted); see also HAYES, supra note 88, at 90 (stating that "concentrated benefits
and costs would be more likely [than widely distributed benefits or costs] to generate activity
by organized groups.").
113. See ARANSON, supra note 88, at 235 (asserting that "the benefits flowing to a group's
members should be divisible, private, in the sense that members of some other group will not
receive benefits as a result .... ").
114. For a discussion of the problems associated with cheating in a cartel, see HERBERT
HovuEtip, ECONOIMCS AND FEDERAL ANTrrRusT LAW 85-89 (1985) (explaining opportunities
for members in cartel to cheat and methods by which members of cartel can make cheating
more difficult).
115. ARANSON, supra note 88, at 235.
116. HAYES, supra note 88, at 65; WILSON, supra note 101, at 331-32.
117. HAYES, supra note 88, at 65; WILSON, supra note 101, at 332-34.
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with goods that confer narrow benefits." ' In sum, lobbying efforts in favor
of, or in opposition to, legislation will increase in proportion to the degree
to which benefits are narrowly conferred or costs are narrowly imposed.
The same factors driving the demand for legislation are at work in
driving the supply. Just as constituents will press more vigorously for
legislation conferring narrow and excludable benefits, legislators will supply
legislation more readily when they can credibly claim credit with their
constituents for having procured the legislative benefit." 9 An individual
Congressman is aware that his constituents will be dubious of claims that
he was single-handedly responsible for a major legislative success. He also
knows that his constituents will be more willing to credit him with a narrow
and discreet legislative procurement aiding his district12° In addition, one
theorist claims that Congressmen expect their constituents to remember votes
against their interests longer than votes in their favor.' 2 ' This creates an
obvious dilemma for legislators faced with some constituents who would
benefit by proposed legislation at a price borne by other constituents.
Congressmen can avoid this problem by exercising a third option beyond
supplying or not supplying legislation. Specifically, Congressmen also can
delegate decision making responsibility to agencies or courts.1n
Congressmen can be expected to exercise this third option in instances
in which one constituent group benefits directly at the expense of another'2 3
whether the costs and benefits of the legislation are widely or are narrowly
distributed. 24 Legislators can use delegation as a means to let both sides

118. HAYES, supra note 88, at 65; WILsoN, supra note 101, at 334-37.
119. See generally MAYHEW, supra note 96, at 52-54. The author explains that because
individual Congressmen cannot convincingly take credit for grandiose legislation, and because
constituents'are aware of immediate legislative procurements, Congressmen seek legislation
that provides particularized benefits to their constituents. Particularized benefits must be given
to an identifiable group and on an ad hoc basis so that a Congressman can have an identifiable
role in their procurement.
120. See Benjamin Zycher, An Item Veto Won't Work, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 1984, at
32 (noting that "it is in the political self interest of politicians to bestow benefits that are
measurable, and to impose costs that are not."); Robinson, supra note 21, at 411 (stating that
"[t]he intuition may be that because of the President's nationwide constituency he is held
specially accountable for the fate of general enactments ....

By contrast, individual Con-

gressmen cannot claim credit for such legislation, and hence are not blamed for its defeat.")
(emphasis in original).
121. See FioRiNA, supra note 96, at 38-39 (explaining influence on Congressmen of "the
ungrateful electorate."). This phenomenon, which defies the pure concept of self-interest
maximization upon which the public choice theory is founded, appears to rest instead on the
psychological intuition that voters will focus on the question "[w]hat have you done for me
lately?" when deciding for whom to vote. See id. at 39.
122. See THEODORE J. Lowi, THm END oF LmERALiSM 59 (1979) (describing process by
which Congress avoids decision making in conflictual situations through broad delegation); see
also HAYES, supra note 88, at 28.
123. See, e.g., MARK V. NADEL, THE PoLncs oF CoNsrmER

PROTECTION

25-27 (1971)

(describing the elusive benefits to automobile consumers of regulatory legislation aimed at
automobile consumer protection); see also HAYES, supra note 88, at 108.
124. For purposes of the item veto debate, the former category of legislation, distributed
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claim victory in the legislative process,121 while blaming the agency at some
future date for imposing the legislative cost. Frequently, regulation results
in the interest groups "capturing" the agency such that the ensuing regulation is closer to the model of legislation under the old pluralist theory.'26
In essence, the interest groups win at the expense of the general public. 27
Wilson and Hayes combine these demand and supply configurations to
matrix on the opposite page
create four legislative categories. The 2four-box
8
summarizes the discussion to follow.1
B.

The Four Box Static Model
While the distributed benefits/distributed costs category is the category
of legislation that Congress was traditionally expected to provide, 29 public
3°
choice theorists posit that, in fact, it is most likely to be undersupplied .
Because this legislative category involves a conflicting demand pattern in
which all constituents receive a slight benefit and incur a slight cost, and
because lobbying efforts are not likely to be intense on either side, legislators
will respond with inaction, or with symbolic action in the form of delegation.' 3' As shown below in the section discussing the dynamic model, one
method Congressmen can use to increase the likelihood that a proposed bill
in this category will secure enough votes for passage is to agree to attach
to the bill legislation from another category in which the incentive for
lobbying is stronger.' 3 2 This is how nongermane riders come into being.
The distributed benefits/concentrated costs category is characterized by
weak lobbying in support of legislation and strong lobbying in opposition,
and is thus conflictual.13 3 An example is socialized medicine. Because everyone at some point requires medical services, the benefits of socialized
medicine would be distributed widely. The costs, in contrast, would be more

benefits/distributed costs is substantially more important than the latter, concentrated benefits/
concentrated costs. See infra notes 163-84 and accompanying text.
125. HAYES, supra note 88, at 108.

126. For a discussion of the pluralist approach to legislative bargaining, see supra note
94. See also HAYES, supra note 88, at 104. Hayes explains that agency capture is sometimes
the actual congressional goal "for only in this way could congressmen minimize the disturbance
to the attentive groups important to their reelection while appearing concerned with the broader
public interest." Id.; but cf. WILSON, supra note 101, at 336 (arguing that agency capture is
less likely in cases where agency is regulating two organized competitors than where it is
regulating one organized interest and one diffuse interest).
127. The propriety of Congressional delegation is well beyond the scope of this article.
For a fuller treatment of the issue, see Lowi, supra note 122.
128. While neither Wilson nor Hayes actually employ a matrix to explain these four
legislative categories, Professors Eskridge and Frickey have created two matrices from the
Hayes model. See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 70, at 53, 55. The matrix in the text is a
modified version as it relates to the discussion in this article.
129. See ARMAsON, supra note 88, at 354; OLsoN, supra note 99, at 35.
130. See HAYEs, supra note 88, at 133; OLsoN, supra note 99, at 35.
131. See generally HAYES, supra note 88, at 120-126.
132. See infra notes 163-83 and accompanying text.
133. See HAYEs, supra note 88, at 102.

407

ITEM VETO

1992]

w0

a

0

C

n

0

14 -Q
- 0

j

c

0

E

0.

--

F

4

E

0

ull(I,

.o..

.-

0

..

ca

w

>- c-

<.

co

C3

..
0. 0

o

ILL

-

z
Lu

3

CDC)

0)>
(0
j
I-

0

:

0
W 1

0O

0

scd

0

=,

0

a~

0
S1g0

R0U

0

.O-

0

0.z .0
-c

0U I

0wniuL~

C.)

r

SE

01GI d3fa&±~

.

01M d

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:385

narrowly contained, falling, at least in the near-term, directly on members
of the medical profession. Until very recently, the American Medical Association has lobbied successfully against proposals to fundamentally redis13 4
tribute access to health care in the United States.

Legislators faced with this conflicting demand configuration are likely
either to do nothing or to delegate.'

The institutional protections or

impediments to the passage of legislation discussed in the constitutional
section are particularly important in this context. 36 In fact, one could argue

that these negative legislative checkpoints 3 7 are in place to slow down or

to stop legislation that benefits the public at large at a cost borne largely
or entirely by a narrow interest group.' 38

In the language of public choice theorists, these negative legislative
checkpoints serve to increase the size of coalitions necessary to succeed in

achieving procurement of desired legislation. 3 9 William Riker, who developed the theory of "minimum winning coalitions," has reasoned that, in
theory, the most stable coalition in a legislative body will be comprised of
one more than fifty percent. A larger coalition can benefit its membership
by excluding others from the generalized benefits until a mere simple

majority is achieved. 40 Riker's theory is really the public choice analogue

134. While the history of American Medical Association (AMA) lobbying efforts in
response to proposals to redistribute access to health care is well beyond the scope of this
article, an informative book that outlines that history from 1940 through 1984 is FRANK
CAMPION, THE AMA AND U.S. HEALTH POLICY SINCE 1940 (1984). The author explains that
while the AMA lobbied against major legislative health care proposals since as early as 1935,
id. at 7-8, it became a more sophisticated lobbying entity in the 1960's and 1970's. See
generally id. at 305-24 (describing AMA lobbying efforts concerning proposed national health
insurance). See also John K. Iglehart, Health Report/Kennedy Efforts to Revise Health
Manpower Carries Over to '75, 6 NAT'L. J. REP. 1949 (1974) (discussing some unsuccessful
proposals by Senator Ted Kennedy to redistribute access to health care). In March 1990 the
AMA published a new sixteen point proposal, "Health Access America," to provide greater
access to health care for those in need. The May 15, 1991 issue of the Journal of the American
Medical Association consisted of a symposium of health care reform proposals, including an
article explaining the AMA proposal. See JAems S. TODD ET AL., Health Access AmericaStrengthening the U.S. Health Care System, 265 JAMA 2503, 2504 (1991) (stating that "[t]he
AMA's number of physicians believe significant improvements in our system need to be made
to improve access, to ensure continued high quality, and to moderate cost increases"). The
JAMA editors did not endorse any particular viewpoint expressed in the symposium.
135. See FIORINA, supra note 96, at 38-39; Lowi, supra note 94, at 50.
136. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
137. The term "negative legislative checkpoints" is used to refer to the various loci at
which an individual legislator or a group of legislators representing minority interests can slow
down or stop a bill or, alternatively, at which minority interests can focus their lobbying
efforts to procure legislative benefits. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
138. Cf. ARANSON, supra note 88, at 368-69 (asserting that "[c]ongressional rules and
procedures partially avoid the hazards of such gambles [of being included in or excluded from
a minimum winning coalition] by making sure that winning coalitions are very large.").
139. See generally WILLIAm H. RIKER, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALmONs 32-46 (1962).
140. Riker's theory is limited to instances in which the legislative benefits and costs present
a zero-sum situation. See id. at 32 (stating that "filn n-person, zero-sum games, where side-
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to Madison's theory of factions. In essence, the negative legislative checkpoints in Congress and the constitutional impediments to the rapid formation
of successful majority factions41reduce the possibility that a simple majority
will be a successful coalition.'
Protection against minimum winning coalitions is especially important
in the distributed benefits/concentrated costs category. It is in this category
that the interests of distinct minority groups are in the greatest danger of

being thwarted in the legislative process. The benefits of these negative
checkpoints as a device to prevent minimum winning coalitions are even
more pronounced in comparison with state and municipal legislatures that
lack them. 42 While the American Medical Association has been successful
in lobbying against proposals to fundamentally redistribute access to health
care, landlords, for example, have been far less successful in opposing rent
control in cities throughout the United States, including New York. 43 While
the interests of the two groups, medical doctors opposed to socialized

medicine and landlords opposed to rent control, bear striking similarities,
the difference in legislative results may reflect the absence of these constiat the state
tutional and structural impediments to the passage of legislation
44

or local level, as compared with their presence in Congress.

payments are permitted, where players are rational, and where they have perfect information,
only minimum winning coalitions will occur."). See also ARANSON, supra note 88, at 65
(positing that "a hypothesis derived from the size principle predicts that large, overweighted
coalitions are less stable than small, minimum winning ones. Larger coalitions have less to
distribute to their members to ensure their loyalty."). But cf. MAYHEw, supra note 96, at 112
(explaining that as corollary to Riker's theory, one would expect congressional roll calls to be
close, but, in fact, they are not).
141. See ARANsON, supra note 88, at 367 (stating that "[t]o pass, bills usually require
more than simple majorities, because unconvinced lawmakers can use any number of lethal
and dilatory strategies for defeating, or delaying, or substantially modifying them."); Harold
H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEx. L. Rv. 207, 219-20
(1984) (explaining that devices such as House Rules Committee agenda controls and threat of
presidential veto serve to increase size of winning coalitions); RIKER, supra note 139, at 89101 (observing that historically, successful coalitions are larger than minimum winning size);
see also JONES, supra note 84, at 95-100; Robinson, supra note 21, at 407-08 n.19.
142. See ARAN ON, supra note 84, at 65 (asserting that according to available evidence,
winning coalitions in state legislatures, as opposed to those in Congress, become increasingly
stable as they approach minimum winning size).
143. See Charles H. Clark, Rent Control and the Constitutional Ghosts and Goblins of
Laissez-Faire Past: Pennell v. City of San Jose, 108 S.Ct. 849, 14 U. DAYTON L. REv. 115,
115 (1988) (stating that "New York City has had ordinary peacetime rent control for almost
the last half century .... Moreover, approximately ten percent of all privafe rental housing
units in the nation were subject to rent control in 1983.").
144. These additional federal legislative hurdles provide protections beyond preventing the
passage of unconstitutional laws. Thus, in Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988) the
Supreme Court held that the rent control ordinance in San Jose, California, requiring that a
hearing officer may consider a tenant's hardship before deciding whether to allow an increase
in rent, did not violate the landlord's due process or equal protection rights. Id. at 11-14. The
Court declined to reach the landlord's claim based on the takings clause on the ground that
the issue was not ripe. Id. at 9. Because the federal legislative scheme has effectively prevented
passage of similar laws regulating rates charged by medical doctors, these structural legislative
hurdles may well provide extra-constitutional protections for minority interests.
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The concentrated benefits/distributed costs paradigm is characterized
by strong demand for legislation and weak lobbying in opposition.4 5 As
one would predict, the result in this situation is the procurement of legislation in favor of the active lobbying group. 46 The most important legislative
byproduct of this category is the rider. In fact, the skewed lobbying
incentives in this category that result in the legislative process of logrolling
are the problem to which the item veto is addressed. 47 Logrolling is the
process by which legislators trade votes for each others' concentrated
benefit/distributed cost items in exchange for their own. 4 The result is an
excess of pork barrel appropriations the sum total of which may leave
everyone worse off than had no legislation been passed at all. 49 Not
surprisingly, perhaps, the logrolling problem is exacerbated in large part by
the very negative legislative checkpoints designed to protect special interests
from general benefit legislation enacted at their expense. The same legislators
empowered to slow down or stop bills encroaching on the rights of particular
interest groups also can use their power to coerce items conferring narrow
benefits on these or other special interest groups. 50
The final category, concentrated costs/concentrated benefits, like the
first configuration, is conflictual. But unlike with the first configuration,
lobbying efforts here are intense on both sides.' This is a classic situation
in which legislators will opt out by delegating their authority to either an
agency or to courts. 5 2 Examples include the National Labor Relations Act,'
establishing the National Labor Relations Board, and the Labor Manage-

145. See HAYES, supra note 88, at 99; WILSON, supra note 101, at 333-34; see also
MAYHFW, supra note 96, at 137 (positing that "Congress will favor the passage of transfer
programs when they are championed by powerful interest groups against unorganized opposition.").
146. See HAYES, supra note 88, at 99.

147. See, e.g., Ross & Schwengel, supra note 9, at 75 (stating that "[tihe item veto would
help to reduce extravagance in public expenditures by curbing the effectiveness of 'logrolling'
and discouraging 'pork-barrel' appropriations."); Daniel Quayle, Line Item Veto Controversy,
CONG. Dia. 259, 278, 279 (November 1985) (asserting that "the threat of a potential [item]
veto can serve as a powerful disincentive to legislators tempted to attach extravagant, wasteful
riders to appropriations bills").
148. See generallyDENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 82-86 (1989) (analyzing logrolling
process); see also ARANsoN, supra note 88, at 369 (defining logrolling as "vote trading, and
back-scratching").
149. Schattschneider describes the logrolling process as "a mutuality under which it is
proper for each to seek duties for himself but improper and unfair to oppose duties sought
by others." SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 94, at 135-36. The author adds that "[tihe very
tendencies that have made the legislation bad ... have, however, made it politically invincible."
Id. at 283.
150. See Robinson, supra note 21, at 417-18 (explaining how senior members of appropriations committee can exact pork for their districts as price for their support for bill).
151. See HAYES, supra note 88, at 108.
152. See id.; Lowi, supra note 94, at 59; see also supra notes 123-27 and accompanying
text (explaining factors that create incentives to delegate).
153. See 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1973); see also ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 70, at 53.
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ment Relations Act, 5 4 vesting federal district courts with authority to resolve
disputes over labor-management contracts. Delegation allows legislators to
claim credit for creating legislative benefits while blaming the agency or
courts for imposing the costs." 5 For the purposes of this article, this
paradigm is not particularly important.
C. Insights from the Static Model
The static model explains the incentives that create a proliferation of
Pareto inferior legislation. Stated differently, the model explains why the
legislative process is like a prisoners' dilemma, in which the interest groups
are prisoners, each seeking to gain at the expense of everyone else with
society as a whole losing in the process.. 6 Although legislation in the
distributed benefits/distributed costs category is desired by all and beneficial
to all, it tends to be undersupplied 5 7 Conversely, while legislation in the
concentrated benefits/distributed costs paradigm is not useful to society as
a whole, it tends to be oversupplied. 15 8
59
Item veto supporters see the device as a way to reverse this trend.
The item veto, supporters argue, would enable the President to sign into
law bills in the distributed benefits/distributed costs category without having
6°
to accept items from the concentrated benefits/distributed costs category.'
In fact, however, as the next subsection will demonstrate, public choice
theory can be used to demonstrate why the item veto will not "cure" the
rider problem. The very forces that create an oversupply of special interest
legislation and an undersupply of general interest legislation work to combine
legislation from the two categories. This is the public choice explanation
for the proliferation of nongermane special interest riders.

154. See 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1978); see also EsICRrDGE & FsucKEY, supra note 70, at 53.
155. See HAtys, supra note 88, at 108.
156. See ARANSON, supra note 88, at 385 (stating that "the members of Congress have
solved their legislativ6 prisoners' dilemma while perpetuating the associated dilemma among
constituents and interest groups.") (emphasis in original). The classic prisoners' dilemma has
been stated as follows:
The police nab a pair suspected of a crime, separate them, and present each with

the following proposition. If one confesses and supplies evidence that can convict
the other who refuses to talk, the authorities will release the confessor and throw
the book at the silent one. If both prisoners remain silent, the authorities have
evidence to convict both only on minor charges. If both prisoners confess, both are
in big trouble. Without communicating, each prisoner must choose either to remain
silent or to confess.
John S. Wiley, Reciprocal Altruism as a Felony: Antitrust and the Prisoner's Dilemma, 86
MICH. L. R-v. 1906, 1915 (August 1988).
157. See HAYEs, supra note 88, at 133; OLSoN, supra note 99, at 35.
158. See HAYEs, supra note 88, at 133; see also WILSON, supra note 101, at 333-34.
159. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
160. See Ross & Schwengel, supra note 9, at 77 (asserting that "[g]ranting the President
the item veto authority would allow him to reject unnecessary and wasteful appropriation
items, and perhaps legislative 'riders,' without at the same time having to reject needed
expenditures, thus endangering the public welfare.").
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The two most obvious solutions to the rider problem are first, to remove
the barriers to legislation that require numerous supermajorities to achieve
legislative success, and second, to provide the President with authority to
audit legislation after it has been passed with an item veto. While removing
the structural impediments to the passage of legislation would potentially
ameliorate the rider problem, however, it would also prevent minority
interests in opposition to legislation passed at their expense from forcing
substantive changes to proposed bills as a precondition to passage. In other
words, this solution would undermine a legitimate by-product of the Madisonian vision of the legislature. In contrast, the item veto does not suffer
the same deficiency. The item veto will not prevent well placed minority
interests from using their power to exact substantive compromises to legislation. In theory, it may prevent the arguably more coercive and illegitimate
tactic of bribery in the form of riders. In short, the item veto appears to
be a perfect solution because it will allow legitimate legislative compromise
while enabling the President to remove pork.
As shown below in the discussion of the dynamic model, however, the
problem with the item veto is that, in practice, it is likely to be ineffective
in curbing legislative practices that benefit special interests at the public's
expense. Nor is it always the case that special interest legislation is an abuse
of the legislative process. The sole means of securing passage of some bills
in the distributed benefits/distributed costs category is to grant a concession
6
in the form of a rider that benefits a narrow group at the public's expense.1 '
Advocates argue that the item veto would enable the President to defeat
these concessions as the price to secure otherwise desired legislation.'6 This
argument fails to consider that once the rules of the legislative bargaining
process change, so too will the dynamics of legislative bargaining. The item
veto will work effectively only if legislators act as if the item veto were not
one of the new rules of the game. As discussed below, legislative and
executive behavior is likely to change in direct response to the adoption and
use of the item veto.
D.

The Dynamic Model

The dynamic model builds upon the static model's analogy of Congress
to a marketplace. Unlike the static model, however, this model is concerned
with options that sponsors of bills in the distributed costs/distributed
benefits category can employ to "buy" votes necessary to secure passage. 63

161. See infra notes 163-83 and accompanying text; see also Riggs, supra note 66, at 73739.

162. One author further contends that because legislators will know that their pork barrel
items are subject to the item veto, the item veto will have the prophylactic effect of actually
discouraging logrolling. See Best, supra note 15, at 189. According to Best, "[t]he [item] veto
is designed to be an incentive for legislative self-control as well as a method of executive

control." Id.
163. One author has developed a bargaining model similar to the dynamic model used in
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The dynamic model is also concerned with the tactics that the vote "seller"
can employ to ensure the greatest likelihood that his proposed rider, from
the distributed costs/concentrated benefits category, will be signed into law.
Some bills may be of sufficient general interest that, even without major
concessions to special interests, sponsors can successfully forge a majority64
coalition. Such bills are rare. Even the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act,'
which had extremely widespread support,' 6 contains provisions designed to
protect, in whole or in part, "politically sensitive" programs from the Act's
automatic budget-cutting mechanism. 66 Not all bills, however, even if aimed
at a matter of significant public concern, will gain majority support so
easily.
The dynamic model focuses on two of the principal tactics that the
sponsor of a general interest bill can employ to gain support. First, the
sponsor can agree to modify the wording of the bill itself.167 If there are
particular provisions that harm constituents in an opponent's district or
that, for any reason, his opponent dislikes, the bill's sponsor can agree to
delete or modify those provisions in exchange for his opponent's vote.
Because this form of compromise alters the initial bill's substantive components, it will be labelled "substantive compromise.' 68 This form of
compromise is not only condoned by, but is an intended by-product of, the
Madisonian legislative scheme. The problem is that a bill's sponsor may be
unable to secure enough votes through substantive compromise, or simply

this article to test the theorem that "[i]n two-party legislative bodies in which the requirements
of internalized party identification and support are met the degree of intraparty cohesion is a
direct function of the degree of interparty competition." David B. Meltz, Legislative Party
Cohesion:A Model of the BargainingProcessin State Legislatures,35 J. PoL. 647, 662 (1973).
Meltz's model tests the relationships among the majority party leadership, nonleadership party
members interested in the passage of particular legislation, and potential party defectors as a
function of the party's relative size in the state legislature. See id. at 651-55. The author
assumes that all intraparty bargaining over proposed legislation takes place before the leadership
buys votes from "across the aisle." Id. at 657. The present article, in contrast, is concerned
with three principal players: first, the sponsor of a bill seeking to secure passage of that bill;
second, the vote "seller" seeking to ensure maximum likelihood that his rider will be signed
into law; and third, the President seeking to sign the general interest legislation he favors into
law without having to sign into law unnecessary pork. The model predicts the conduct of all
three players in the legislative marketplace both with and without the item veto.

164. 2 U.S.C. § 903 (1988).
165. For a discussion of the widespread support in Congress for the Gramm-RudmanHollings Act, see Stith, supra note 5, at 596 & nn.12-13.
166. See id. at 631 and cites contained therein (explaining that major entitlement programs,
among others, were expressly exempted under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act).
167. Cf. Meltz, supra note 163, at 562 (positing that "[o]nce this wording [of a proposed
bill] is fixed, any deviation lowers the value of that motion to the leadership, since by
assumption the original motion is optimal with respect to what the leadership considers to be
in the best collective interests of the party.").
168. See id. at 656. Professor Meltz observes that because the relative value of the bill
to the leadership decreases as the bill's substantive components are compromised, the price
that the leadership is willing to pay to secure passage also decreases. See id. at 654.
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may not want to water down.the substantive content of his bill beyond a
certain point, 69 to secure passage. To secure still further support, however,
the sponsor has a second mode of attack. The sponsor can "buy" votes
by offering to attach special interest items or riders favorable to those who
either oppose or who are indifferent to the bill's success. 70 Because this
form of compromise does not alter the substance of the bill's pre-existing
provisions beyond the changes already made through substantive compromise, but rather adds new provisions, it will be labelled "length compromise." In essence the bill's sponsor agrees to add items to the bill, often
unrelated to the bill's fundamental purpose, in exchange for votes. Revisiting
the new revised four box matrix on the next page may help to understand
this model and the discussion to follow.
Because special interest items impose a cost on everyone, these items
make the bill less popular with other Congressmen and more likely to be
vetoed by the President.' 7' The bill's sponsor, therefore, will not want to
72
attach any more special interest items than are necessary to secure passage.
To fully understand the model, it is necessary to consider the bargaining
process from the vantage point of the vote seller. Once the vote seller
receives a favorable rider in exchange for his commitment to vote for a
bill, he too wants the bill to pass and not be vetoed. Because each additional
item adds unpopular weight to a bill, a vote seller will seek to attach his
item to the bill most likely to be signed into law by the President.'" Thus,
as the number of special interest items in a given bill increases and,
correspondingly, as the number of supporting votes increase, sellers of votes

169. Cf. id. at 652.
170. Cf. id. at 657-58. Professor Meltz explains that after the "watered-down motion"
emerges from the process of negotiating the wording with party members, the leadership can
then buy votes from the other party through a number of means, including logrolling. Id.;
see also Riggs, supra note 66, 739 (1973) (stating that "[t]he practice of enacting legislation
through riders ...can significantly expedite the legislative process.").
171. Cf. W=ILm J. KEEFE & MORRIS S. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIvE PROCESS:
CONGRESS AND Tm STATES 17-18 (5th ed. 1981). The authors describe the overriding goal of
a bill's sponsor as garnering sufficient support to secure passage with the minimum number
of concessions to gain that support. Id. at 17. The authors observe that the result is often a
bill with "a curious assortment of provisions," the end product of which no one, including
the sponsors, "really wants." Id. at 18. For a discussion of some additional devices the
sponsor of a bill can employ to build a successful coalition, see RIKER, supra note 139, at
108-14.
172. The sponsor's desire to avoid adding unnecessary special interest items is the flipside of Riker's theory of minimum winning coalitions. Cf. RrR, supra note 139, at 32-33.
In other words, a bill's sponsor will seek to avoid adding a special interest item to gain votes
that are no longer necessary once a successful majority is achieved.
173. Just as coalitions larger than a simple majority are theoretically unstable because
coalition members can benefit by excluding those beyond a simple majority, here too all
members of the coalition, regardless of when or how they joined, e.g., whether through
substantive bargaining or through length bargaining, now seek to exclude any additional "dead
weight" in the form of special interest items that are not essential to the bill's passage and
that may increase the prospect of a presidential veto. Cf. RIKER, supra note 139, at 32-33.
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will seek out other bills in need of support in exchange for their special
interest items. 174 Specifically, they will look to those bills that are the least
likely to be vetoed even with their riders attached. 75

The result of this process is that both the substantive content of a bill
as well as its length 76 are the product of a series of negotiated compromises.
At first blush, the item veto appears to remove the incentive for the second,
but not the first, form of bargaining. And because the first form of
bargaining is seen by some as more legitimate than the second,'" the item

veto is viewed as a uniquely acceptable solution. Because sellers of votes
exchange their support for general interest bills for the inclusion of desired

riders, they will not sell their votes if their items are subject to a separate
veto. The whole point of the compromise from their standpoint is to enhance

the likelihood that the President will sign their riders into law. If the bill's
sponsor cannot assure them of this, then their incentive to bargain is
removed. This may prevent sponsors of general interest legislation from
buying the votes necessary to forge a successful coalition.
The item veto Congress trade-off therefore appears to be the following:
With the item veto Congress can be expected to produce less "pork, but also
to produce less general interest legislation; without the item veto Congress

can be expected to produce more of both. Assuming this is the trade-off,
there is no way to determine in theory which result is better.
In fact, however, the item veto trade-off is not so straightforward. A
closer analysis of the dynamic model makes less clear exactly what the item
veto trade-off really is. Ironically, perhaps, the changed relationship between

the President and Congress resulting from the item veto actually may serve
174. Of course, a vote seller will not trade his vote for any bill in exchange for a rider.
If the proposed legislation is grossly inconsistent with either the seller's own values or his
perception of the values of his constituents, the seller may forgo the trade altogether.
175. For some bills that result in logrolling, the supermajority may be of sufficient size
that any fear of a veto is removed. If the bill generates sufficient supermajority support for
an override, vote sellers will be less concerned with Presidential approval. In fact, however,
presidential vetoes rarely are overridden. One author calculated that of 1398 presidential vetoes,
only 98, or seven percent, were overridden. See Bellamy, supra note 7, at 575. Of those 98
overrides, three Presidents, Andrew Jackson, Harry Truman, and Gerald Ford, account for
about forty percent. Id. This emphasizes the extent to which most legislation passes as a result
of supermajorities at a relatively narrow margin, e.g., between 51 and 66 votes in the Senate,
and the corresponding percentage in the House of Representatives. The relatively small number
of critical "swing" votes increases the power of legislators to exact concessions in the form
of substantive and length compromise.
176. By length of a bill, I do not mean physical length per se, as items obviously vary
in length as do bills, but rather the number of items in the bill, especially the number of items
added solely to secure votes and that increase the prospect of a presidential veto.
177. See Bergzon v. Secretary of Justice, 299 U.S. 410, 415 (1937) (describing process of
logrolling and resulting creation of riders as "pernicious"). But see Riggs, supra, note 66, at
739-40 (describing expediting passage of legislation and enhancing Congress's bargaining power
with President as positive aspects of riders). Riggs argues that if the President possessed a
separate veto power over nongermane riders, he "would possess a much larger bargaining chip
with which to purchase compliance on the part of Congress, and the use of riders to force
presidential acceptance of legislation would be eliminated." Id. at 756.
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to tie the President's hands with respect to the special interest legislation
that the item veto is designed to reduce, while at the same time greatly
enhancing the President's role in determining which general and broadbased matters of legislative policy actually get passed.
While theoretically the item veto is designed to reduce the bargaining
incentives that lead to pork, barrel legislation, the item veto in practice is more
likely simply to change the players in that process. Assume, for example, that
the sponsor of a general interest bill needs votes to secure the bill's passage
but either is not willing to water down his bill via substantive compromise or
has already engaged in all the substantive compromises he is willing to make.
The previous discussion suggests that with the item veto he no longer can
employ length bargaining. In fact, he still can. Provided that the President
supports his bill, the legislator still can engage in length compromise by getting
the President to promise not to item veto the vote seller's special interest
item. 7 Assuming that the President places a high value on his credibility, he
is not likely to take such bargains lightly. To ensure his ability to make such
compromises in.the future, the President will not likely renege on a promise
to refrain from using his item veto power. 7 9
Thus, the item veto changes the bargaining strategies that legislators
who are either willing to sell their votes or who are empowered to exercise
negative legislative checkpoint powers are likely to employ. With the item
veto in place, legislators will look not only at the overall likelihood that a
bill with their special interest item attached will survive the President's
general veto, but also will look more favorably at bills that the President
supports as a matter of policy. Legislators will do so because attaching a

178. Professor Robinson posits two hypothetical scenarios in which a legislator can coerce
the President vested with item veto power to accept special interest items in exchange for
agreeing to support a bill the President supports. See Robinson, supra note 21, at 417. In the
first, the legislator makes an arms-length exchange with the President of mutual support for
each other's favored legislation. Id. In the second, the legislator, uncertain of whether the
President intends to separately veto his special interest item, severs the item and has it presented
as a separate bill, holding his support for the President's favored legislation "hostage" to the
President's approving his pork item. Id. at 418-19. Of course, for the latter strategy to work,
the legislator would need to obtain sufficient support for his special interest item in both
Houses of Congress to secure passage. Id.
179. In promising to refrain from item vetoing a particular rider, the President does not
necessarily promise to refrain from vetoing in its entirety the bill to which the bargained for

rider is attached. The President can credibly take the position with the rider's sponsor that
while he will not separately veto the rider, he reserves the right to veto the entire bill if the
bill becomes weighted down with too many riders to justify signing the bill into law. By
limiting his promise to the rider itself and not to the entire bill, the President immediately
places the rider's sponsor on his side in future negotiations over the bill with congressmen
empowered to exercise future negative legislative checkpoint powers. Neither the President nor
the rider's sponsor will want further dead weight added to the bill. The Congressman's
willingness to accept these terms will depend upon his perception as to first, whether the bill

is likely to pass without so much additional dead weight added that it will incur the President's
general veto; and second, whether his prospect for having his rider signed into law is greater
if the rider is attached to a different proposed bill with presidential support.

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:385

special interest item to a bill that the President will not veto in full no
longer ensures that the President will refrain from item vetoing the "purchased" special interest item. But if the President supports an overall piece
of legislation still in need of votes for passage, then a vote seller might be
able to secure the President's promise not to veto that item in exchange for
the vote seller's support for the bill. One final look at the matrix, on the
opposite page, may help to illustrate the revised bargaining process.
The vote seller will now seek to attach his rider to that bill, still in
need of votes, that the President favors and that is least offensive to him
politically. The sponsors of bills with presidential approval will look for
those riders that are the least costly overall or least offensive politically to
attach, offering in exchange the President's promise not to exercise his
separate veto. As the more neutral, or least partisan, bills with presidential
approval gain sufficient support for passage, vote sellers will face increasingly difficult decisions whether to support less agreeable bills sponsored by
the President or whether to forgo altogether their pork barrel items.
The end result of this process is that the item veto authority will greatly
increase a President's power to determine which matters of general legislative
policy get passed without the need to veto, in full or in part, legislation.
Instead of having to confront Congress directly with a highly publicized
general veto to control the direction of legislative policy, the President can
now achieve the same result through a nonconfrontational and indirect
means. By simply not promising to refrain from exercising his item veto
authority with respect to particular special interest items, the President can
effectively decide which bills, among those still in need of support, secure
enough votes for passage.
The irony inherent in this analysis is twofold. First, the item veto may
wind up conferring real power over general legislative policy issues 80 onto
the President, but comparatively little power to excise narrow, special interest
items. Second, the item veto would enable the President to influence the
shape of legislation without having to actually veto anything, whether it be
an item or an entire bill. It is easier for the President to choose which
general legislation to support actively than it is for him to choose with
whom he must bargain to get that legislation passed. In other words, the
President cannot control which Congressmen possess the various negative
legislative checkpoint powers that can slow down or stop his favored
legislation from passage.'' Similarly, the President has little or no control

180. Cf. Riggs, supra note 66, at 757 (stating "the added power to veto nongermane
amendments to bills would not only increase executive influence but would establish the
presidency as the primary locus of policy-making in the federal government.").
181. The fact that the President cannot control which Congressman is empowered to slow
down or stop a favored bill explains why the President may not always succeed in buying the
cheapest pork as the means to secure passage of favored legislation. It does not explain,
however, why the President often may end up having to buy the most expensive pork. To
understand that, it is necessary to develop the model somewhat by introducing the concept of
side payments. Cf. RKlER, supra note 139, at 108-23 (describing generally various types of
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over which of his political opponents will be swing votes necessary to pass
his favored bills. Because a bill must survive numerous legislative hurdles
or checkpoints before enactment,1 2 and because multiple majorities at
different times are necessary to secure passage of any bill, a President may
wind up tying his hands with respect to the special interest items that the
bill's sponsors must "buy" to secure that bill's passage.
In addition, the President can avoid having to become involved in the
day-to-day bargaining necessary to gain support for bills he supports by

delegating to the bill's sponsors the authority to make the necessary promises
not to veto items attached to the bill in exchange for critical votes. Because
the sponsors of bills with presidential approval are likely to be the President's

political allies, the item veto is further likely to enhance the political clout
of those allies.

It is worth noting that even if the item veto is limited to appropriations
bills, the President's power to determine the direction and shape of legislative

policy will dramatically increase. Just as the item veto makes the aggregation
of items within a bill irrelevant, so too, it makes the separation of items
between bills irrelevant. Suppose for example that the President supports a
particular bill, Bill B, that needs additional votes for passage. Suppose

further that Bill B is not an appropriations bill but rather is a bill that
confers general legislative benefits. A vote seller or a legislator empowered

to exercise a negative check on Bill B now can negotiate with the President
over a special interest appropriation in Bill A. If the President will refrain
from item vetoing the special item attached to Bill A, the legislator promises
to vote for, or to expedite the passage of, Bill B. Because many special
interest items are in the form of appropriations, bargaining across bills in

side payments in the legislative bargaining process). For purposes of the dynamic bargaining
model set forth in this article, a side payment is simply another type of legislative bargain
that arises when a Congressman empowered to exercise a negative legislative checkpoint power,
see supra note 137, to slow down or stop the President's favored bill, agrees to condition
passage, not on the President's promising to refrain from item vetoing his own pork project,
but rather on the President's promising to refrain from item vetoing a colleague's pork project.
In return for substituting his colleague's pork project for his own, the first Congressman will
demand a side payment from his colleague. That side payment can take a variety of forms,
e.g., a promise to reciprocate, a promise to support an altogether different bill that the first
Congressman supports, or a promise of support for succession to an important committee
chair, to name a few. Of course, the bargain could also be a repayment of a prior side
payment in the opposite direction in which the second Congressman gave up his own pork
project to ensure that the President would not item veto the first Congressman's pork project.
The first Congressman's willingness to engage in such side-payment bargaining will depend
upon how he assesses the relative value of his own pork project at the time he is empowered
to exercise a negative legislative checkpoint power versus the relative value of the return
promise, in whatever form it may take. The end result, however, from the President's standpoint
is that he is often left having to accept the more expensive piece of pork as the price for
passage, even if the pork belongs to a Congressman not then in immediate control of the
particular negative legislative checkpoint, rather than simply having to accept random pork.
182. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
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this manner is quite likely.' 83 Thus, even if item veto authority is limited to
appropriations bills, the effect of the item veto may be less significant with
respect to special interest or pork barrel items than it is with respect to
larger matters of legislative policy.
Finally, the dynamic model can be used to illuminate the constitutional
debate. The model demonstrates that part of the brilliance of the constitutional structure is that it both benefits by and promotes individual
Congressmen and Senators acting in pursuit of their own self interest and
those of their constituents. It is this very quality of the Constitution that
renders the item veto unnecessary.
Sidak and Smith recently argued in support of their position that the
President may presently possess item veto power that if Professors Tribe
and Kurland are correct in stating that Congress alone determines the
package of legislation that constitutes a "bill," then "[i]n an extreme case,
Congress could take an entire session's work (including appropriations
legislation) and package it in a single piece of omnibus legislation."'1 The
authors go on to state: "[t]he Constitution should be read to avoid this
absurdity, if possible."' 5 Similarly, in theory, even without the item veto,
Congress could package all items as individual "bills" and render item veto
power unnecessary. This hypothetical, the flipside of that offered by Sidak
and Smith, suffers from the same deficiency. Neither takes into account
the incentives on the part of individual legislators that result in the size,
content, and number of bills passed during each session of Congress. The
dynamic model can be used to display the limitations of Sidak and Smith's
reductio ad absurdem as a justification for conferring item veto power upon
the President.
183. Spitzer speculates that with the item veto, the President may engage in a similar
bargaining process across bills. See SPITZER, supra note 7, at 131 (asserting that "[t]here is no
reason to believe that Reagan, or any other president ... would refrain from threatening to
item veto favored projects of wavering congressmen as a method of lining up votes (e.g., for
a bill the president favo:s)."). Fisher and Devins have observed that:
White House lobbyists could advise a member of Congress that certain projects in
his or her district or state are being considered for an item veto. At the same time,
the member could be asked how he or she plans to vote on the administration's bill
scheduled for consideration the following week. Perhaps a minor project would
survive in'return for the legislator's willingness to support a costly program.
Fisher & Devins, supra note 16, at 191. See also Thomas B. Cronin & Jeffrey J. Weill, An
Item Veto for the President, 12 CONGRESS & THE PRESrDENCY 127, 138 (1985) (stating that
"[a] determined 'arm twisting' President, for example, could threaten to item veto perfectly
legitimate expenditures of importance to individual legislators merely because they dare to
oppose the White House on one of the President's pet projects."); Norman J. Ornstein, Veto
the Line Item Veto, FORTUNE Jan. 7, 1985, at 109 (positing that "[i]f the line item veto had
been available last year when Congress cut 25% from Reagan's proposed outlays on the MX
missile, calls would have been made by the White House to recalcitrant legislators suggesting
that a favored dam or building would be item-erased if the law maker didn't support the MX.
We would have paid for all those dams and buildings-and more MXs.").
184. See Sidak & Smith, supra note 11, at 467; see also William A. Clineburg, The
Presidential Veto Power, 18 S.C. L. REv. 732, 753 (1966).
185. Sidak & Smith, supra note 11, at 467.
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The sponsors of one piece of general interest legislation seeking to buy
votes through length bargaining become the vote sellers, seeking to have
their own riders purchased by sponsors of other such bills. All are players
in a continuous dynamic process. These same legislators actively oppose
still other general legislation and further seek to prevent the passage of
riders that do not benefit their bills but impose general costs on their
constituents. In each session of Congress, each Congressman and Senator
seeks to maximize his own benefit by engaging in exchanges that will provide
the greatest likelihood that the general interest legislation that he supports,
and the riders that he has sold, will be passed and signed into law. At the
same time, each Congressman and Senator seeks to minimize the prospect
that the bills of general interest and riders that he opposes will pass. It is
through this continuous and complex process that the large number of bills
of varying content and length, passed in each session of Congress, take
their form.
The Sidak and Smith hypothetical assumes that Congress as an institution seeks to have all its bills signed into law each session. Instead,
Congress is really an aggregation of individual Congressmen and Senators,
each of whom seeks to have some bills signed into law and to prevent other
bills from being signed into law.18 The same dynamic legislative bargaining
process that affects the substance and length of each bill further affects the
number of bills passed each session of Congress. It is difficult to imagine
a single legislator, let alone all 535 of them, who would be willing to rubber
stamp any and all legislative proposals that cross his desk or who would
agree with the content of every bill passed each term. When Congress is
properly viewed as an institution comprised of individual legislators, each
seeking to maximize his own benefits and those of his constituents, rather
than as an institution with a collective institutional psyche at odds with the
White House,8 7 the hypothetical's value loses its force as justification for
conferring item veto power upon the President.
IV.

HISTORcAL EVIDENCE

Two sources provide the closest historical data to test the thesis
advanced in the preceding section. This section will address first, presidential impoundments and second, state experience with the item veto.
The data show that, historically, Presidents and governors vested with
impoundment authority and item veto authority respectively have not used
those powers to curtail unwanted pork barrel legislation, but rather have
used their powers to impose their legislative priorities in place of those of
the legislatures.

186. Cf. ARANSON, supra note 88, at 21 (asserting that "[a] group can have no goal apart
from those goals that individual members of the group might pursue.").

187. See id.
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PresidentialImpoundments8 '
While the first President reported to have impounded funds appropriated
by Congress was Thomas Jefferson,8 9 the history of impoundment really
begins some one hundred seventy years later with Richard Nixon. 9° Whereas
in 1803 Jefferson refused to spend money appropriated by Congress for
gunboats to protect the east bank of the Mississippi River because the
Louisiana Purchase made such protection unnecessary, 19' an action with
which Congress agreed,192 Nixon freely refused to spend money appropriated
by Congress simply because he disagreed with congressional priorities. 93
This new use of impoundment power has been characterized by some critics
as a de facto item veto. 94
Louis Fisher distinguishes the two types of impoundments, labelling95
Jefferson's impoundment "routine" and Nixon's impoundment "policy.'
Fisher describes the distinction as follows:
A.

188. It is important to distinguish the actual exercise of impoundment power from the
types of practices discussed in the preceding section. The preceding section asserted that item
veto power may allow the President to exert great influence over legislative policy by providing
him with a trump card in the legislative bargaining process. In contrast, presidential impoundment comes into play only after a statute is passed.
In theory, of course, the same sort of bargaining could occur in the impoundment setting.
Individual legislators empowered to substantially modify or slow down bills that the President
supports could bargain for promises that the President will not impound funds earmarked for
their pork barrel projects. Such bargaining may have been less likely in the impoundment
context simply because impoundments with which Congress disagreed have been of dubious
legality. See generally L. Harold Levinson & Jon L. Mills, Impoundment: A Search for Legal
Principles, 26 U. FLA. L. R-v. 191, 220 (1974) (stating that "[t]he consensus is that the
President does not possess any authority that justifies him in terminating or drastically curtailing
a program in frustration of the intent of Congress."); Warren J.Archer, Comment, Presidential
Impounding of Funds: The JudicialResponse, 40 U. Cm. L. Rav. 328, 356 (1972-73) (positing
that "[the President] has no authority to use impounding as an absolute, retroactive, or item
veto."). Item veto power, in contrast, most likely would be conferred by constitutional
amendment and thus the exercise of that authority would be legitimate. See Dixon, supra note
15, at 225 (explaining why constitutional amendment may be required to enact item veto).
189. See Cathy S. Neuren, Note, Addressing the Resurgence of PresidentialBudgetmaking
Initiative: A Proposal to Reform the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 63 TEx. L. Rav.
693, 695 (1984).
190. See Levinson & Mills, supra note 188, at 199 (explaining qualitative differences
between Nixon's impoundments and those of his predecessors); see also W. Bradford Middlekauff, Note, Twisting the President's Arm: the Impoundment Control Act as a Tool for
Enforcing the Principle of AppropriationExpenditure, 100 YALE L.J. 209, 212 (1990) (stating
that "the Nixon Administration changed the unwritten rules of the impoundment battle.").
191. See Middlekauff, supra note 190, at 191.
192. See id. (asserting that "[t]his refusal to spend caused little furor.").
193. See Louis FisHER, PREsIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 150-51 (1975) at 150 (stating that
President Nixon's efforts "directly challenged the right of Congress to make policies and
decide priorities.").
194. See Timothy R. Harner, PresidentialPower to Impound Appropriationsfor Defense
the
and Foreign Relations, 5 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PbL'Y 131, 135 (1982) (positing that "[iff
President signs a bill which contains many appropriations and then impounds any of the
appropriations, he has in effect exercised an item veto.").
195. See Louis Fisher, CongressionalBudget Reform: The First Two Years, 14 HAv. J.
ON LEGIs. 413, 448 (1977).
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Routine impoundments do not by themselves restrict authorized
programs and activities and do not interfere with the priorities for
spending which are established by Congress. Policy impoundments,
however, reflect Presidential decisions to substitute administration
spending priorities for those chosen by Congress and act independently of other circumstances to restrict congressionally authorized
programs and activities.1 96
Whereas prior Presidents had used impoundments to curtail military appropriations over which they had at least arguable constitutional authority as

Commander in Chief, 97 Nixon for the first time used impoundment as a
means to reorder, in wholesale fashion, congressional budgeting priorities. 9
In addition to relying on dubious historical arguments, 99 including analogizing his impoundments to Jefferson's, Nixon made at least three other
types of argument to justify his impoundments.
First, Nixon often relied on the lack of mandatory spending language
in appropriations statutes, arguing that the absence of this language implied
executive discretion to spend or not to spend appropriated funds. 200 Second,

196. Id. at 448. In City of New Haven v. United States, 809 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit distinguished programmatic from policy deferrals using similar terms:
The critical distinction between "programmatic" and "policy" deferrals is that the
former are ordinarily intended to advance congressional budgetary policies by ensuring that congressional programs are administered efficiently, while the latter are
ordinarily intended to negate the will of Congress by substituting the fiscal policies
of the Executive Branch for those established by the enactment of budget legislation.
Id. at 901 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
197. For a discussion of impoundment history in the context of military procurements,
see Neuren, supra note 189, at 695-96; see also Harner, supra note 194, at 138-146.
198. See FISHER, supra note 193, at 150. Because Presidents prior to Nixon in their
exercise of impoundment power did not attempt to subvert congressional priorities on policy
matters, their use of impoundment is not germane to this article.
199. While Nixon was the first President to use impoundment as a full-scale policymaking
device, see id., he relied on several instances of earlier executive impoundment, almost all of
which are distinguishable, to justify his actions. See generally Neuren, supra note 189, at 69598 (distinguishing Nixon's impoundments from those of his predecessors); see also FtsHER,
supra note 193, at 176.
200. See FisHER, supra note 193, at 177 (stating that "the mere existence of discretionary
authority, which had been granted by Congress to enable executive officials to administer the
programs more effectively, was used as an excuse to deny the programs in their entirety.").
The Supreme Court, as early as 1838, suggested that the President lacks this inherent
discretionary authority.
In Kendall v. United States ex rel Stokes, 37 U.S. (11 Pet.) 524 (1838), the Supreme
Court held that the Postmaster General could not refuse to expend appropriated funds that
were required to fulfill a contractual obligation by the federal government. Id. While the
actual holding of the case was thus limited insofar as the President did not himself impound
the funds and the basis for the appropriation was contractual, the Court's language was not.
See id. at 613. Thus, the Court stated: "[t]o contend that the obligation imposed on the
President to see the laws faithfully executed, implies a power to forbid their execution, is a
novel construction of the constitution, and entirely inadmissible." Id.
The Kendall dictum suggests that the absence of mandatory spending language does not
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Nixon claimed that specific statutes conferred impoundment power. 20 1 Finally, Nixon argued that fiscal emergency justified executive impoundment
when Congress failed to act to ameliorate economic crisis. 2 2 In spite of the
dubious nature of these purported bases for presidential impoundment,
made clear by the nearly unanimous condemnation of this practice by courts
and commentators, 2 3 Nixon freely used impoundment to reorder Congressional priorities. 2°4
Beginning early in his second term, Nixon requested that Congress enact
a two-hundred and fifty billion dollar spending ceiling. 2 5 When Congress
failed to do so, Nixon responded by announcing one through executive
fiat.? To enforce this ceiling, Nixon impounded funds in several domestic
programs, almost entirely along partisan lines, that in some cases effectively
wiped out entire Democratic programs. 2° 7 For example, Nixon impounded
funds appropriated for the Rural Environmental Assistance Program, 20 8 the
Water Bank Program, 209 the Farmers Home Administration (FHA),210 the
Rural Electrification Administration,2? the Environmental
Protection
213
Agency, 212 and Housing and Urban Development.
In contrast, Nixon allowed the full commitment of funds for defense
programs such as the B-1 bomber and the C-5A cargo plane. 21 4 While a
detailed analysis of the Nixon impoundments is well beyond the scope of
this article, this section will briefly review two such cases, the first because
it is typical of the others and the second because it demonstrates the
extremes to which Nixon was willing to go to effectuate his partisan
legislative priorities.
The first case involves the Department of Agriculture's refusal to release
funds appropriated for the emergency farm loan program established under
imply executive authority to thwart congressional intent. Id. In fact, several cases during the
Nixon administration confirm this broader reading. See, e.g., Train v. City of New York, 420

U.S. 35 (1974); Berends v. Butz, 357 F. Supp. 143 (D. Minn. 1973) (requiring Secretary of
Agriculture to release appropriated funds).

201. See Neuren, supra note 189, at 699-700 for a discussion of Nixon's claimed reliance
upon the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, Ch. 8, 42 Stat. 20, repealed by Act of Sept.
13, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-258, 96 Stat. 877; 1950 Amendment to the Antideficiency Act,
General Appropriations Act of 1951, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1511-1512 (1982); and Employment Act of
1946, codified as amended, at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1025 (1983).

202. See Neuren, supra note 189, at 701. Because Truman lost a similar argument in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), Nixon supplemented this

argument with one based on congressional acquiescence. See Neuren, supra note 189, at 701.
203. See Middlekauff, supra note 187, at 212.
204. See generally FIssnR, supra note 193, at 150-51.

205. See id. at 175.
206. See id. at 176.

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

See generally id. at 175-97 (providing detailed account of Nixon's impoundments).
See id. at 177.
See id.
See id. at 179-80.
See id. at 181-83.
See id. at 184.
See id. at 192-94.
See id.
at 180.
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the FHA. 25 Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz justified the impoundment
on the ground that it was necessary both to comply with the President's
budget ceiling and to counteract inflation. 216 After Butz instructed the
Minnesota FHA office not to accept any more loan applications from
farmers in the fifteen counties previously declared eligible for federal disaster
relief funds, four farmers initiated a class action suit. In Berends v. Butz" 7
the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota held that the
Department of Agriculture's refusal to implement the program violated
mandatory provisions of the Agriculture Act of 1961, the Department's
own regulations, and the Due Process Clause. 28 Shortly thereafter, Congress
amended the statute to remove the discretionary language. 21 9
The second case is even more striking. In 1972 Congress enacted the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments over Nixon's veto. 2 0 In
spite of the override Nixon impounded fifty-five percent of the funds allotted
under the program, basing his authority on allegedly ambiguous statutory
language.Y l The dispute arose from a change in the language of the bill
during the conference committee from a proposed requirement that all sums
be allotted to a requirement that sums not to exceed a set amount be
allotted.rn This language actually was intended to prevent a veto, and the
legislative history strongly suggests that Congress intended discretion at the
expenditure rather than at the allotment stageY2 Notwithstanding the intent
of the statute and that it was enacted over a veto, Nixon impounded more
than half the funds and effectively terminated the program by stringing out
the litigation for two years until he ultimately lost before the Supreme
Court.
In Train v. City of New Yorkn the Supreme Court held that the change
in language from "all sums" to sums "not to exceed" did not provide the
President with discretion to commit a lesser amount. While the holding
was limited to the statutory language,226 the Court implied that Congress is
authorized to eliminate executive discretion over appropriations. The Train

215. See id. at 179-81.
216. See id. at 179-80.

217. 357 F. Supp. 143 (D. Minn. 1973).
218. Berends v. Butz, 357 F. Supp. 143, 149-52 (D. Minn. 1973).
219. See FisHER, supra note 193, at 181.
220. See id. at 184; see also Federal Water Pollution Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
§ 2, 86 Stat. 816, 834 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1387 (1982)).
221. See FisHER, supra note 193, at 191.
222. See id. at 184-85.
223. See id. at 184-86. See also Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975) (holding
that no discretion was allowed under statute at allotment stage).
224. 420 U.S. 35 (1975).
225. Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 43-44 (1975).
226. See id. at 41 (stating that "[t]he sole issue before us is whether the 1972 Act permits
the Administrator to allot to the States under § 205(a) less than the entire amounts authorized
to be appropriated by § 207.") (footnote omitted).
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decision thus set the stage for the Impoundment Control Act of 1974,2 7
which severely curtailed executive impoundment authority.
Although no President has been as willing as Nixon to supplant congressional policies with his own, even with the stricter statutory limits on
impoundment authority, Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan have used
impoundment as a device to reorder Congressional priorities, sometimes
suffering setbacks by the judiciary and Congress as had Nixon.228
1.

Policy Impoundments Under the Impoundment Control Act of 1974

In response to Nixon's abuse of the impoundment power, Congress
enacted the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.2 9
In addition to establishing budget committees in each house of Congress,
the Act established procedural limitations on presidential impoundment. 30
Specifically, the Act divides impoundments into two categories, deferrals,
which involve withholdings not to exceed one year, and rescissions, which
involve permanent terminations.' 31 As a result of a conference committee
2
compromise, the Act established different procedures for each type.
Under the statute, policy deferrals remained in force unless either house
of Congress voted disapproval.?3 This legislative veto provision was held
unconstitutional in City of New Haven v. United States 234 following the
Supreme Court's decision in Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha.?35 The City of New Haven court further held that the legislative
veto provision was inseverable from the statute's deferral section as a
whole.? 6 Before the City of New Haven decision, Congress amended the
Antideficiency Act to foreclose the President from relying on it for policy
deferrals. 7 Thus, the City of New Haven court left the President with
authority only to make rescissions, with full congressional approval "within
forty five days of a special impoundment message of the President,"12 8 and
to make routine or administrative deferrals.? 9

227. Pub. L. No. 93-344, §§ 1001-1017, 88 Stat. 297, 332-37 (codified as amended at 2
U.S.C. §§ 681-688 (1982)).
228. See infra notes 240-56 and accompanying text.

229. Pub. L. No. 93-344, §§ 1001-1017, 88 Stat. 297, 332-37 (codified as amended at 2
U.S.C. §§ 681-688 (1982)).
230. See id.; see also FxsHaR, supra note 193, at 198.
231. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 683(b) and 684(b) (1991) (as amended); see also Neuren, supra note
186, at 704.

232. See

Fis

ErR,

supra note 193, at 199.

233. See 2 U.S.C. § 684(b) (1982).
234. 809 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
235. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).

236. City of New Haven v. United States, 809 F.2d 900, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
237. See City of New Haven, 809 F.2d at 906 n.18.
238. See Neuren, supra note 189, at 704.
239. City of New Haven, 809 F.2d at 906, 909. The court noted that the amendments to
the Antideficiency Act did not affect the President's authority to "implement routine programmatic deferrals." Id. at 906 n.18.
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Ironically, perhaps, under the 1974 Act Gerald Ford actually increased
the number of policy impoundments. 40 Under the Ford Administration's
reading, the Act provided broad authority to impound all funds.?" Thus,
roughly one-third of Ford's deferrals and almost all of his rescissions were
policy impoundments. 242 In addition, almost all impoundments involved
nondefense programs?' 3 One major reason why Congress was unable to
respond effectively under the Act's provisions was that it was simply
overwhelmed by the amount of paperwork generated by the Ford administration.2" The congressional disapproval rate for Ford's rescissions was
sixty-three percent based upon total number of rescissions and seventy-one
percent based upon total amount of rescinded funds?' 5
Jimmy Carter, in contrast, submitted both defense and nondefense
impoundments to Congress under the Act. 246 The disapproval rate for
Carter's rescissions was twenty-nine percent based upon total number of
rescissions and thirty-one percent based upon total amount of rescinded
funds, 7 While Carter impounded less frequently than did Ford, 24 it is
worth considering one case involving an appropriation under the Federal
Highway Act.'

9

The Impoundment Control Act contained a provision that stated that
the Act would not supercede mandatory spending provisions in other statutes. 20 Carter interpreted this to apply only to pending cases, so that the
Act's impoundment procedures would trump future appropriations with
mandatory language.251 Thus, Carter impounded forty-six and a half million
dollars in highway funds allocated to the State of Maine. 2 2 In Maine v.
Goldschmidt 3 the United States District Court for the District of Maine

240. See FISHER, supra note 193, at 200 (observing that "[i]nstead of performing as a
restriction on Presidential power, it was interpreted by the [Ford] Administration as a new
source of authority for withholding funds.").
241. See id.; accord Neuren, supra note 189, at 705.
242. See Neuren, supra note 189, at 705.
243. See id. at 706.
244. Id. (noting that "Ford's impoundments generated a crippling amount of paperwork
for Congress.").
245. See Middlekauff, supra note 190, at 219.
246. See Neuren, supra note 189, at 708.
247. See Middlekauff, supra note 190, at 219.
248. See Neuren, supra note 189, at 707-08.
249. See id. at 707; see also 23 U.S.C. § 101-58 (1991) (as amended).
250. See 2 U.S.C. § 681(4) (1982) (providing that "[n]othing in this Act ... shall be
construed as- . .. (4) superseding any provision of law which requires the obligation of
budget authority or the making of outlays thereunder.").
251. See Maine v. Goldschmidt, 494 F. Supp. 93, 99 (D. Me. 1980) (stating that "[tihe
Secretary argues that the entire disclaimer in the Impoundment Control Act was intended
solely as a temporary measure to avoid prejudicing then pending litigation over the impoundment issue.").
252. See id. at 96-97.
253. 494 F. Supp. 93 (D. Me. 1980).
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held that the Act's procedures do not supercede appropriations
statutes with
4
mandatory language that are enacted after the 1974 Act.2
Finally, during the Reagan administration, the number of proposed
rescissions increased dramatically, especially during the final six years, after
the Republicans lost control of the Senate. During the last six years, the
disapproval rate was seventy-six percent based upon total number of rescis2 55
sions and ninety-eight percent based upon total amount of rescinded funds,
whereas during the first two years, when the Republicans controlled the
Senate, it was thirty-three percent based upon total number of rescissions
6
and thirty percent based upon total amount of rescinded funds.2
2.

Conclusions

The foregoing review of impoundment history demonstrates that ever
since the Nixon administration, Presidents have been willing to use impoundment as a device to substitute congressional priorities with their own
over matters involving not simply special interest legislation, but rather,
matters of legislative policy.2 S7 This history is illuminating for two reasons.

First, the legal basis for many of these impoundments, especially during
the Nixon era, was questionable at best. Second, and perhaps more importantly, given the questionable legal basis of these practices as well as the
strong protests by congressional leaders, many impoundments subjected the
Presidents who enacted them to publid scrutiny and criticism.
To the extent that using the item veto affirmatively as a bargaining tool
would increase executive control over the budget while decreasing public
scrutiny, Presidents are that much more likely to use it.2 In fact, the item
veto so exercised would give Presidents the best of both worlds: an increased
perception of Presidential control over policy as more bills are passed that
match the President's agenda, and a decreased perception that the President
is acting at odds with Congress because the actual number of items or
entire bills vetoed is reduced.
One could respond by asking, if impoundment authority under the
Impoundment Control Act is a de facto item veto, why have Presidents
since Nixon failed to use it as a bargaining tool in the manner predicted

254. See id. at 98-99.
255. See Middlekauff, supra note 190, at 219.
256. See id.
257. While the benefits associated with some of the projects subject to impoundment
undoubtedly contained pork, the foregoing impoundment history nonetheless demonstrates that
the device was used more generally to effectuate the Piesident's partisan concerns and to
substitute his own legislative priorities for those of Congress. As stated earlier in this article,
most goods cannot be divided absolutely into the categories of public or private goods. See
supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text. This definitional problem does not diminish the
argument in the text that Presidents have not limited their use of impoundments to special
interest projects to control the federal budget.
258. Cf. HAYEs, supra note 88, at 158 (positing that "[p]olicymakers ... thrive on
imperfect information.").
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by this article? In fact, it is not clear that they have failed to do so. After
all, there is no public record of presidential conversations with congressional
leaders. More importantly, however, the real issue is not whether they have,
but whether they could. No President before Nixon had exercised impoundment authority as broadly and, indeed, as boldly as he did even though,
theoretically, all had precisely the same authority or lack thereof to do so.
The lesson from the impoundment discussion is that proponents of a
constitutional amendment to confer item veto power upon the President
must consider not simply how the amendment reasonably can be interpreted
and used, but also how it is capable of being interpreted and used. A
politically adroit President could use the item veto to gain substantial control
over general matters of legislative policy. While a President could try to
use the 1974 Act to engage in such bargaining, there is one very fundamental
distinction. An act can be repealed through ordinary legislation. A constitutional amendment cannot be. If Presidents have not so used their impoundment authority under the 1974 Act, it may be due to a perception
that even limited impoundment authority is better than none at all. Given
Congress's willingness to remove this power after Nixon's abuses, the
somewhat reserved exercise of power by subsequent Presidents may simply
reflect greater political aptitude. One need look no further than to the
states, however, to see how drastically this picture could change with a
constitutional amendment creating the item veto.
B.

The State Experience

As indicated at the outset, forty-three states currently vest their governors with item veto power. 219 While commentators dispute the relevance of
the state experience to the federal situation, 260 no one can dispute that the
states provide an extremely rich source of data as to the potential uses and
abuses of the item veto.
This section will first compare the federal budgetary process with those
of the states to put the discussion in its proper context. This section will
then review three statistical studies on the state experience with the item
veto to show that even with the significant differences between both levels
of government, the state experience generally supports this article's thesis.
1. The State/Federal Distinction
There are at least four major distinctions between the federal budget
and state budgets. The first and most frequently cited distinction is the
varying percentage of those government budgets devoted to mandatory

259. See Spitzer, supra note 27, at 611.
260. Compare Dixon, supra note 13, at 286 (asserting that "[ilf a Federal item veto with
majority override works. as well at the Federal level as it does in my own State of Illinois, it
could save $27 billion a year or more") with Edwards, supra note 24, at 201 (positing that
"[s]tates are not small Federal governments .... There is no valid parallel.").
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spending. 26' Because of the relatively large portion of the federal budget
allocated to mandatory spending, including entitlement programs and interest on the deficit, the nondiscretionary portion has been estimated at five-

ninths of the overall budget. 262 Of course, the remaining four-ninths is not
likely to fall subject to the item veto because that portion is divided between
defense and social programs. 263 The real percentage of the federal budget

subject to the item veto has been estimated at closer26 to thirteen percent,
excluding one of these categories along partisan lines.

4

In contrast, almost all state constitutions require balanced budgets and,
thus, states typically have lower mandatory net interest payments than does

the federal government. 265 In addition, the percentage of mandatory spending
overall is much lower at the state level because no state has a defense budget

and because states have fewer mandatory social programs. 26 As a result, a
far higher percentage of items in state budgets can be subjected to the item
veto.
The second major distinction between the federal and state budgetary
processes is that most states have both balanced budget amendments and

single subject amendments. 267 As a result, the item veto at the state level is
a supplemental rather than primary budget-cutting tool. At the federal level,
even as amended the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act alone does not provide
an effective means of eliminating uncontrolled congressional spending. 268 In
addition, there is no effective single subject requirement except the limitation

on nongermane riders in the House of Representatives. 269 Because the item

261. See, e.g., Aaron Wildavsky, Item Veto Without a Global Spending Limit: Locking
the Treasury After the Dollars Have Fled, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETmcs & PUB. PoL'Y, 165,
167 (1985); Item Veto: State Experience, supra note 20, at 57.
262. See Item Veto: State Experience, supra note 20, at 57.
263. See id. at 60.
264. See Wildavsky, supra note 261, at 167 (estimating federal discretionary spending at
13 percent of overall budget); Item Veto: State Experience, supra note 20, at 57 (estimating
same at 4/9 of overall budget in 1985); see also Zycher, supra note 120 (estimating fixed
expenses, based upon entitlements and interest, at $495 billion of total $925 billion 1985
budget); Ornstein, supra note 183 (estimating discretionary spending that would be subject to
item veto for 1985 at $62 billion out of overall budget of $926 billion).
265. See Veto Procedures in the States, Line Item Veto Controversy, CONG. DIG. 259 at
264 [hereinafter "Veto Procedures"].
266. See Edwards, supra note 24, at 201.
267. See Veto Procedures,supra note 265, at 265 (stating that 49 states require balanced
budget).
268. See Stith, supra note 5, at 599 (stating that "GRH does not and cannot take politics
out of the spending process, and hence it cannot reduce the deficit without a sustained political
consensus to achieve this end."). One reason why the Act is less effective than as originally
proposed is precisely because in the course of legislative bargaining, "politically sensitive"
programs were exempted from the automatic budget cutting mechanism. See id. at 631. In
August 1990 an OMB spokeswoman estimated the automatic budget cuts under GrammRudman-Hollings for the 1991 federal budget at about $100 billion if Congress could not agree
on a balanced budget. See also Barbara Gamarekian, Uncertain Future at the Smithsonian,
N.Y. TnMEs, Aug. 7, 1990, at C14; Steven Mufson & John E. Yang, Both PartiesNow Fearing
Automatic Budget Cuts, WASH. PosT, May 9, 1990, at A7 (estimating automatic cuts for 1991
at $36.5 billion).
269. See ESKRIDGE & Fmcicy, supra note 70, at 25-26 note v.
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veto thus would be a primary rather than supplemental budget-cutting tool
at the federal level, unlike at the state level, concerns over presidential
involvement in the legislative process are that much greater.
The third major distinction between state budgets and the federal budget
involves the structure of appropriations bills themselves. State appropriations
tend to be well detailed and itemized. 270 This detail, in part, enables
governors with item veto power to use that power effectively. 27' In contrast,
federal appropriations are lumped together, thereby leaving agencies greater
discretion as to how to spend federal funds.2 72 While committee reports at
the federal level include recommendations as to how federal funds should
be spent, the shear size of the federal government precludes the level of
detail within appropriations bills that is customary at the state level. 273 As
a result, the item veto is likely to be a far less effective tool for federal
budget reductions than it is for state budget reductions. 274
The final major distinction stems from the difference between the
structure of Congress and that of most state legislatures. Members of
Congress meet full time for relatively long sessions, whereas members of
state legislatures often meet part time and for fairly short sessions. 25 The
result of this distinction is predictable; legislation at the state level is often
in greater need of revision to fully effectuate its underlying policies. 276 The
increased executive role through use of the item veto at the state level may
therefore be justified on straightforward functional grounds. The relatively
greater degree of professionalism and the increased opportunities for reflection on legislative matters in Congress, in contrast, would tend to militate
against heightened involvement of the President in the legislative process.
These distinctions aside, the states remain an extremely rich source of
information on the potential change in executive-legislative relations that an
item veto would entail. 277
270. See Item Veto: State Experience, supra note 20, at 61 (stating that "[s]ome state
constitutions require the legislature to consider detailed appropriations so that items are
available to the governor to be vetoed.... Even without explicit constitutional or statutory
direction, the courts have called for sufficient itemization in state appropriation measures to
allow the governor effective use of the item veto.").
271. See id.

272. Cf. id. at 63 (asserting that "[t]o demand that appropriations bills include detailed
allocations in order to make the item veto more effective may cost more in executive discretion
than it's worth.").
273. See id. at 56-65.
274. See id. at 56 (noting that "[b]ecause the individual projects are not specified in
appropriation bills, the President could not veto the items he calls pork barrel projects.").
275. See SPIrZER, supra note 7, at 137 (observing that "[iun short, state legislative executive
relations are very different from those at the federal level. State legislatures are typically parttime bodies, meeting for only a few months out of the year. For this reason alone, state
governors need greater authority.").
276. See KEEFE & OauL, supra note 171, at 367 (stating that "[i]n the states, the veto is
used because bills duplicate one another, because acts of legislatures are vague and incapable

of enforcement, or because technical flaws have occurred in drafting"); see also SPrrzER, supra
note 7, at 137.
277. For an extensive study of the state experience with the item veto, see generally Item
Veto: State Experience, supra note 20.
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Statistical Studies on Gubenatorial Use of the Item Veto in the States

Three studies have attempted to test whether use of the item veto
correlates with fiscal irresponsibility on the part of the legislature. The first
study, by Glenn Abney and Thomas Lauth, 78 was based on a three-year
history from 1979 to 1982 across forty-five states. 279 The second study by
James J. Gosling, 210 was longitudinal, based on a ten-year history from
1975 to 1985 in Wisconsin.2I The third study, conducted by Benjamin
Zycher, compared per capita state, and state and local, spending in 1981
in the seven states without the item veto with similar spending in the fortythree states with the item veto. 28 2 While all three studies are designed to
draw general conclusions applicable to the federal situation, the unique
aspects of the Wisconsin item veto render that study somewhat less useful? 3
Nonetheless, all three studies support the general thesis that the item veto,
in practice, is likely to provide the President with greater opportunities to
influence matters of general legislative policy than power to curtail unwanted
special interest legislation.
Abney and Lauth sent questionnaires to the state legislative budget
officers or the chief staff member of the house appropriations committee
in each state and received forty-five responses.? Using three measures of
fiscal restraint the authors tried to determine whether fiscal restraint tended
to reduce the incidence of item vetoes. These measures were: 1) "the
propensity of the legislature to make decisions on the basis of benefits for
the districts of legislators," -commonly referred to as pork barrel; 2) "the
propensity of the legislature to increase the budget recommendations of the
governor"; and 3) "considerations of an agency's efficiency in legislative
285
decisions about the agency's budget.1
Regardless of the measure used, there was no significant correlation
between the frequency of item veto usage and legislative fiscal irresponsibility. 2 6 The authors found a slight, but statistically insignificant, increase
in item vetoes in states more prone to pork barrel legislation. 28 7 Similarly,
the item veto, in practice, was "not used to maintain the expenditure levels
of the executive budget."' ' 8 Finally, while the authors found a positive
correlation between use of the item veto and absence of efficiency mind-

278. See Glenn Abney & Thomas P. Lauth, The Line-Item Veto in the States: An

Instrument for Fiscal Restraint or an Instrument for Partisanship?,45 PUB. AD. REV. 372
(1985).

279. See id. at 374.
280. See James Gosling, Wisconsin Item-Veto Lessons, 46 PUB. ADMN. REv. 292 (1986).
281. Id. at 294.
282. See Zycher, supra note 120.
283. See infra notes 294-301 and accompanying text.
284. Abney & Lauth, supra note 278, at 373.

285. Id. at 374-75.
286. Id.
287. See id. at 374.
288. Id.
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edness in state legislatures, the correlation was statistically insignificant. 28 9
The authors discovered that the use of item vetoes increased when
different parties controlled the executive and legislative branches. 290 In
addition, in states with Republican governors and Democratic legislatures,
29
governors were more likely to use the item veto as a tool of fiscal restraint. '
In light of these data, Abney and Lauth concluded that if the President is
granted item veto power he is more likely to use it as a partisan tool than
292
as a tool to reduce the deficit.
While Gosling was critical of Abney & Lauth's conclusion that the item
veto is primarily a partisan tool, 293 his own study did little to refute that
thesis. To the extent that his conclusions do not support that thesis, it may
be due to the unique qualities of item veto law in Wisconsin. The Wisconsin
Constitution empowers the governor to veto all language including statutory
or session law within appropriations bills in whole or in part. 29 In a 1978
decision, State ex rel Kleczka v. Conta,2 95 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
upheld the governor's use of the item veto to strike "provisos and conditions
to an appropriation so long as the net result ... is a complete, entire, and
296
workable bill which the legislature could have passed in the first instance."
Analyzing this decision, Gosling concluded that there were but two restrictions on the governor's use of the item veto: "appropriation amounts [must]
be vetoed in their entirety (that selective striking of a digit or digits is not
allowable), and that what remains after veto be a 'complete and workable'
law. ' 297 In fact, Gosling's conclusion proved premature. In 1988 the Wisconsin Supreme Court, as anticipated in the Kleczka dissent, 291 upheld the
Wisconsin governor's selective striking of digits and words. 299 This decision
was overturned by a constitutional amendment, passed by the Wisconsin
legislature, and ratified by Wisconsin voters in April 1990. 300
Essentially, the Wisconsin governor is empowered to become a creative
legislator, wholly changing the intent of an appropriations bill, provided
that what remains is a complete working law that is germane to the subject
of the partially vetoed bill. 3°0 This additional legislative power on the part

289. Id.
290. See id. at 375-76.
291. See id.

292. See id. at 376-77.
293. See Gosling, supra note 280, at 293.
294. Wis. CONST. art. V, § 10; Gosling, supra note 280, at 293; Item Veto: State
Experience, supra note 20, at 231.
295. 82 Wis. 2d 679, 264 N.W.2d 539 (1978).
296. State ex rel. Kleczka v. Conta, 82 Wis. 2d 679, 715, 764 N.W.2d at 539, 555 (1978).
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of the governor may reduce the extent to which he must rely on his allies
in the legislature to formulate items in line with his policy directives. By
simply adding or deleting key terms, the governor can virtually create policy
out of whole cloth.
In fact, the results of Gosling's study comport with this thesis. Analyzing
542 vetoes over a ten-year period based on several distinguishing characteristics including the type of language vetoed, the fiscal effect, whether the
veto involved pork, and various separation of powers concerns, 30 2 the author
concluded that the item veto is not primarily a tool of fiscal restraint. 3°0 In
fact, the author discovered that "only 14 percent [of items vetoed] directly
affected appropriations."104 Instead, the author concluded that the primary
impact of item vetoes was to substitute the governor's policy priorities for
305
those of the legislature.
Finally, Zycher 's study demonstrates that overall spending at the state
level, and state and local levels combined, 3°0 were actually higher on average
in the forty-three states with the item veto than in the seven states without
the item veto. 3°7 Zycher concludes that either the item veto is an ineffective
tool to reduce pork barrel appropriations, or that it actually encourages
legislative irresponsibility by enabling legislators to claim credit for legislative
procurements while shifting the blame onto governors when those procure30 8
ments are later taken away.
While the state experience is not fully predictive of federal practice, the
fact that most governors with item veto power have not used it as a tool
of fiscal restraint is informative. These studies provide support for this
article's central thesis that a President vested with item veto power is more
likely to use that power to affect legislative policies than to curtail unwanted
pork barrel legislation. Moreover, given the unique structural impediments
to passing legislation at the federal level, the likelihood that the President
will try to influence policy before legislation is passed through active
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303. See id.at 295.
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305. See id.at 296 ; accord Burke, supra note 300, at 1423-24 (noting that "[h]istorically,
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analysis of the use of the item veto in the State of Washington, see Stephen Masciocchi,
Comment, The Item Veto Power in Washington, 64 WASH. L. REv. 891 (1989). The author
concludes that:

The use of the item veto power in Washington bears little relation to its historical
purpose of reducing wasteful spending. The item veto power has placed the governor
in the position of a superlegislator who eliminates legislative compromise through
veto of provisos.
Id.at 911.
306. See Zycher, supra note 120. Zycher compared purely state spending with state and
local spending because "what may be a state function in one place is a local responsibility
elsewhere." Id.
307. See id.
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participation in the bargaining process rather than through post hoc auditing
is all that much greater.
V.

CONCLUSION

This article has considered the constitutional debate surrounding the
item veto and has then analyzed the item veto using public choice theory
to predict how, in practice, this device is likely to change the dynamics of
legislative bargaining betweefi the White House and members of Congress.
The prediction drawn from this analysis, that the item veto is likely to
provide the President with greater power to control overall matters of
legislative policy than it is power to curtail unwanted pork barrel appropriations, is supported by the history of both presidential impoundments
and gubernatorial use of the item veto in the states. Both the analysis and
the historical support demonstrate that the item veto seems both a misguided
and potentially detrimental device to control federal budget excesses.

